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Over the past three decades of school finance litigation, attorneys have
focused their lawsuits on the needs of particular types of school districts rather
than particular types of children. Lawyers have based their legal complaints on
the funding disparities between high-wealth and low-wealth districts rather than
differences in needed resources between individual students from privileged
and at-risk backgrounds. However, addressing district-to-district inequities
might not improve educational opportunities for all students whose
socioeconomic background places them at risk of academic failure. Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court raised this very concern in its landmark school
finance decision San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.I The
Court noted that "the poorest families are not invariably clustered in the most
impecunious school districts.' 2 Decades later, some legal scholars argue that
the school finance movement continues either to ignore or inadvertently miss
the goal of improving education for all at-risk children.3 Indeed, very few
school finance cases have asked courts to target remedies toward immigrant,
minority, and poor children across an entire state instead of children in
particular low-wealth school districts.
4
t J.D., Yale Law School, 2004. The author would like to thank Chief Justice Burley Mitchell,
Judge Howard Manning and all of the attorneys and education advocates who were interviewed for this
Essay, Professor James Ryan and Tom Saunders for their thoughtful comments and encouragement, and
Joseph Blocher and Jennifer Peresie for their editorial assistance.
1. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that differentials in per
pupil school funding do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
2. Id. at 57.
3. William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard Questions Posed by Rodriguez: Ending the Separation
of School Finance and Educational Policy by Bridging the Gap Between Wrong and Remedy, 24 CONN.
L. REv. 721, 730 (1992). Clune noted that:
Critics of school finance litigation continue to point to the possibility that poor students might
predominantly live in urban districts of above-average wealth and would be harmed by a
redistribution of state aid toward poorer districts. What occurred was a disjuncture between the
alleged constitutional wrong-the low spending and political powerlessness of poor districts-
and the responsiveness of the proposed remedy to the group of students most clearly deserving
of special protection.
Id.
4. But see Thomas Saunders, Settling Without "Settling": School Finance Litigation and
Governance Reform in Maryland, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 571, 578 (2004) (noting that the Maryland
litigation was brought by the ACLU specifically on behalf of a class of at-risk children in Baltimore).
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The attorneys in Leandro v. State of North Carolina5 did not originally
intend to forge a new path. However, over the past ten years, the focus of
Leandro has evolved from inter-district funding disparities to individual child-
based vertical equity, the notion that students with greater needs should be
given greater resources. 6 Specifically, the Leandro litigation produced a ruling
that all at-risk children across North Carolina are constitutionally entitled to
more resources in the form of an extra year of public schooling through pre-
kindergarten classes.
The State of North Carolina appealed the trial court's decision to the state's
supreme court,7 and as this Essay goes to print, the court has not yet ruled on
the constitutional right to pre-kindergarten classes for at-risk children. In the
meantime, this Essay analyzes the manner in which the Leandro litigation has
progressed and speculates on how it may spark a new direction in school
finance litigation. Part I provides background information on the North
Carolina public school system. Part II introduces the individuals and school
districts that brought the Leandro litigation. It also describes the state's major
school finance rulings, including the unanimous supreme court decision in
Leandro v. State and the four-part decision in the trial court remand, known as
Hoke County v. State.8
Part III analyzes the ways in which the Leandro and Hoke County rulings
place this litigation at the forefront of the school finance reform movement.
This Section describes how the Leandro plaintiffs successfully utilized the
state's standards and accountability program to aid their litigation efforts. It
also analyzes the reasons why race did not become a divisive factor in Leandro,
examines the litigation's evolution toward the concept of vertical equity, and
weighs some of the advantages and disadvantages accompanying school
finance lawsuits that focus specifically on at-risk students. Part III concludes by
predicting a new trend of pre-kindergarten as a remedy in school finance
However, the Maryland attorneys defined their lawsuit class by a combination of at-risk status and
geographical district lines. This Essay discusses the advantages and disadvantages of bringing school
finance litigation on behalf of at-risk children without regard to geographical district lines. See
discussion infra Section III.C.
5. 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997) (finding that the state constitution guarantees every child the right to
receive a "sound basic education").
6. Vertical equity "specifies that differently situated children should be treated differently." Robert
Berne & Leanna Stiefel, Concepts of School Finance Equity: 1970 to the Present, in EQUITY AND
ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE 7, 20 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999). Specifically, "inputs are
,adjusted' for the costs of educating various groups of children" in order to "indicate the amount of
additional resources that are needed ... to bring some students to given output levels." Id.
7. N.C. Supreme Court Takes Leandro Case, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Mar. 19, 2003, at B8.
8. Judge Howard E. Manning handed down his ruling in four memoranda of decision. See Hoke
County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County I), No. 95 CVS 1158 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000) (on file
with author); Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County II), No. 95 CVS 1158 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Oct. 26, 2001) (on file with author); Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County Ii), No. 95 CVS
1158 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2001) (on file with author); Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke
County IV), No. 95 CVS 1158 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2002) (on file with author).
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lawsuits in other states.
Part IV assesses what the Leandro litigation has accomplished for public
school students in North Carolina thus far. It measures the litigation's impact in
terms of increased political momentum for certain legislative proposals, equity
and adequacy of current public school funds, and innovative expansion of
constitutional rights.
I. THE NORTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM
A. Brief Overview of North Carolina's Public Schools
The North Carolina Public School System is divided into 117 school
districts, 9 the majority of which have coterminous boundaries with the state's
100 counties. Relative to other states, North Carolina's state government covers
a large share of public education funding: State money constitutes about 69%
of the public school operating funds, local money represents 23%, and federal
money comprises slightly less than 8%.10 These figures do not include capital
expenses, however, which North Carolina leaves primarily to local
governments to fund. Furthermore, the state's public schools face the challenge
of educating a high proportion of poor students compared to the rest of the
country: Nationwide, thirty-one percent of all children qualify for free and
reduced-price lunch, while in North Carolina, more than thirty-nine percent of
children qualify. 1'
For the past decade, North Carolina's flagship education policy has been
the ABCs (Accountability, Basics, and local Control) of Education Act of 1995,
which created a standards and accountability program for all public schools.
12
Under this program, the State Board of Education sets annual performance
standards for each school in order to measure the growth of student
achievement. 13 The program assesses each school's performance with end-of-
grade examinations that are given to students in core subjects, and the State
holds individual schools accountable for their students' performance.
14
9. N.C. DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, 2002 STATISTICAL PROFILE vi (2002), available at
www.ncpublicschools.org/fbs/stats/StatProfileO2.pdf.
10. Hoke County l, slip op. at 54.
11. Hoke County l, slip op. at 13.
12. An Act To Implement the Recommendation of the Joint Legislative Education Oversight
Committee To Implement the State Board of Education's ABC's Plan in Order To Establish an
Accountability Model for the Public Schools To Improve Student Performance and Increase Local
Flexibility and Control, and To Make Conforming Changes, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 716 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 115C (2003)).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-105.35 to 105.37 (2003).
14. Several consequences may result if student performance is low for two or three consecutive
years, for example: each school may have to notify the parents of its students of its low-performing
status; the state may assign an assistance team to aid the school in meeting its goals; and if the assistance
team fails to improve the school's performance, the state is authorized to dismiss school personnel. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-105.37A (2003).
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According to Education Week, a leading national publication, the ABCs
program "has gained a national reputation as an effective tool in raising
academic standards and improving low-performing schools."' 15 Despite the
national praise, however, the program's results have been mixed. On the one
hand, since the inception of the ABCs, the number of public schools ranked
"low-performing" has decreased by ninety percent. 16 Moreover, the state's
SAT-takers have improved their performance by forty points over the course of
the past decade, as compared to a twenty-one point increase for the nation as a
whole. 17 Even with this improvement, however, North Carolina remains tied at
forty-seventh on the national SAT state rankings, only a slight improvement on
its previous rank of fiftieth.' 8 Worse yet, the state has the nation's second-
highest percentage of dropouts among sixteen- to nineteen-year-olds. 19 It
remains unclear, then, whether the ABCs program has benefited North
Carolina's children in terms of academic achievement. However, as discussed
in Part III, the standards and accountability program has aided the Leandro
plaintiffs' litigation strategy.
B. Brief History ofPre-Leandro School Finance Litigation in North Carolina
In 1987, North Carolina courts considered the constitutionality of the state's
school funding system for the first time. In Britt v. North Carolina State Board
of Education,2 ° plaintiff Robeson County School District challenged the
funding disparities that resulted from the state's school funding system. 2 The
plaintiff district based its legal claims on the state constitution's equal
protection clause and education clause, the latter of which reads: "The General
Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform
system of free public schools, which shall be maintained at least nine months in
every year, and wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all
students. 22
Despite strong textual support for a constitutional right to equality of
educational resources, 23 the Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that this
15. Kathleen K. Manzo, Quality Counts 2002: State Policy Updates, EDUC. WK., Jan. 10, 2002, at
144-45.
16. Brief for Defendant-Appellants at 10, Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. COA02-1181
(N.C. Ct. App., filed Feb. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Brief for Defendant-Apellants].
17. The SAT Story: Once Again, a Glass Half-Full or Half-Empty, PUB. SCH. FORUM's FRIDAY
REPORTS, Aug. 31, 2001, at 2, available at http://www.ncforum.org/2001/08310l .pdf.
18. Id.
19. Debbie Cenziper, Schools Cry Out For State's Help, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 18, 2001, at
B I (citing 2000 U.S. Census figures).
20. Britt v. N.C. State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
21. Robeson County later became a plaintiff in the Leandro litigation.
22. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2, cl. 1.
23. See Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 320 (1991) (ranking North Carolina's constitution in the first tier of all states in
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language does not require the state to "provide identical opportunities to each
and every student." 24 The court grounded its ruling on the apparent intent of the
"equal opportunities" portion of the education clause, which the state's voters
created in a 1970 constitutional amendment. The court wrote:
The voters that adopted [the amendment] were emphasizing that the days of
"separate but equal" education in North Carolina were over, and that the people of
this State were committed to providing all students with equal access to full
participation in our public schools, regardless of race or other classification.
25
Consequently, the court ruled that the education clause guaranteed only "equal
access" to the state's schools, not equal opportunities or equal funding within
them.
26
In the years following Britt, North Carolina education advocacy groups
began aggressively highlighting the funding inequities across the state. A
fledgling education non-profit called the North Carolina Public School Forum
began publishing yearly reports that analyzed school funding inequities.
27
These reports ranked districts in terms of support for education by evaluating
tax effort, which compares a district's tax rate with its ability to pay.28 The
Forum studies showed that despite having relatively small amounts of potential
revenue, North Carolina's poor counties were taxing themselves at much higher
rates than wealthy counties. In 1994, the year the Leandro litigation began, the
ten poorest counties in the state averaged a tax rate of seventy-five cents per
$100 of assessed real estate value, while the wealthiest ten counties averaged
fifty-two cents per $100.29 An earlier Forum report demonstrated that funding
and wealth differentials correlated quite strongly with student performance: the
average SAT score of students in the top five30 counties in the Forum's survey
of the North Carolina counties' "ability-to-pay" was more than 120 points
higher than that of the five3 1 lowest-ranked counties in the survey.
32
A few years later, the General Assembly responded to public pressure with
a program of supplemental funding that was not intended to fully equalize
spending among districts, but rather narrow the gap by bringing the lowest-
terms of requiring equality, as it is only one of four state constitutions to "actually [use] the word
'equality' in defining the state's obligation").
24. Britt, 357 S.E.2d at 436.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Interview with Gerry Hancock, founding member of the Public School Forum of North
Carolina and Partner at Everett, Gaskins, Hancock & Stevens, L.L.P, in Raleigh, N.C. (Mar. 17, 2003)
[hereinafter Hancock Interview].
28. Id.
29. PUB. ScH. FORUM OF N.C., LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY 5 (1994).
30. Interestingly, three of the top five wealthiest counties-Forsyth, Mecklenburg, and Wake-
became plaintiff-intervenors in the Leandro litigation.
31. Two of the bottom five counties-Hoke and Robeson-became plaintiffs in Leandro.
32. PUB. SCH. FORUM OF N.C., ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM 6 (1990).
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spending districts up to the level of the average-spending districts. 33 However,
the supplemental funding project has never received full support. The 1991
General Assembly appropriated only $6 million for the Low-Wealth
Supplemental Fund when estimates placed the cost of full funding at
approximately $200 million.34 After several more years of unsuccessful
lobbying efforts, many superintendents and attorneys of low-wealth school
districts became frustrated and began to contemplate litigation. 35 According to
one attorney who was involved at the beginning of the litigation:
It was clear that it would be many, many, many years before it was fully funded, if
ever. And in early 1994, several of the counties began talking and came to the
conclusion that without litigation they didn't feel they would have the pressure that
was necessary to get this issue dealt with properly.
36
Thus, in North Carolina, as in many other states, plaintiffs brought school
finance litigation because the political process did not produce meaningful
reform.
II. LEANDRO v. STATE
A. The Leandro Litigation Begins
In May of 1994, five low-wealth, rural counties37 filed suit against the State
of North Carolina and the State Board of Education, alleging that the state had
failed to provide equal and adequate educational opportunities as required by
the state constitution and related statutes.38 Plaintiffs' attorneys chose the five
plaintiff school districts from among the seventy districts receiving money from
the General Assembly's partially-funded equalization program because of the
particularly strong interest of the five districts' superintendents, as well as the
litigating attorneys' desire to keep the case manageable. 39 Pointing to finance
33. See 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 689, § 201.2(a).
34. Hancock Interview, supra note 27; see also Interview with John Doman, Executive Director,
Public School Forum of North Carolina, in Raleigh, N.C. (Mar. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Doman
Interview] ("They created the fund, with a commitment to phase it in over time, and then reneged on
their commitment. It was within a year of that that the lawsuit got filed.").
35. E-mail from Robert Spearman, Leandro plaintiffs' attorney and Partner at Parker, Poe, Adams
& Bernstein, L.L.P., to author (Apr. 2, 2003, 17:30:18 EST) (on file with author) ("Certainly one reason
the client districts decided to pursue suit was their frustration with the legislature not fully funding the
low wealth program.").
36. Hancock Interview, supra note 27.
37. The plaintiffs included the school boards of Cumberland, Hoke, Halifax, Robeson, and Vance
counties, as well as children then enrolled in each of those school systems and their parents.
38. Amended Complaint at 2, Leandro v. State, No. 94 CVS 520 (N.C. Super. Ct., filed Sept. 28,
1994) [hereinafter Amended Complaint].
39. "The plaintiff school districts emerged based first on the strong leadership of school
superintendents in the districts .... We considered whether additional school districts should or would
participate, and made a judgment that adding districts would make the case more complicated without
corresponding benefits." E-mail from Robert Tiller, Leandro plaintiffs' attorney and Partner at Parker,
Poe, Adams & Bernstein, L.L.P. (May 8, 2003, 10:57:40 EST) (on file with author); see also Hancock
Interview, supra note 27 ("The question was discussed if the consortium as a whole should join the
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inequities resulting from the state's system of public school finance, the
plaintiffs made both equity and adequacy arguments as they petitioned the
court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs asserted five legal
claims against the State: one claim under the equal protection clause of the
North Carolina Constitution; 40 two claims-equity and adequacy-under the
education clause; 41 one claim under the "law of the land" or due process
clause;42 and a statutory claim based on state laws that guarantee certain
minimum levels of education.43
Robert Leandro, the litigation's named plaintiff, was then an eighth grader
in the Hoke County School System.4 He described watching science
experiments on video tape because his biology classes had no laboratory
equipment,45 having to begin each class by copying school materials by hand
off of an overhead projection machine because his teachers did not have funds
to make photocopies, and being frustrated that some of his school's athletic
teams could not play away games because the district did not own sufficient
buses.46 These problems are not surprising given the size of Hoke County's tax
base. When the litigation was filed, Hoke County had an adjusted tax base47 per
child of $110,296 and total local spending per pupil of $467, while Dare
County-North Carolina's highest-ranked county in "ability-to-pay"-had an
adjusted tax base per child of $1,059,100 and total local spending per pupil of
$2,410.48 Hoke County taxed itself at a higher rate than Dare County, but Hoke
was only able to spend one fifth as much as its wealthier counterpart.
In October of 1994, six high-wealth, urban school districts49 filed a
complaint against the State and successfully intervened as plaintiffs in the
Leandro litigation. Since several of these districts were among the highest
spending in North Carolina, the plaintiff-intervenors did not make claims based
litigation. But that would have made for very cumbersome litigation.").
40. Amended Complaint, supra note 38, at 25 (citing N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19).
41. Id. at 24, 26-27 (citing N.C. CONST. art. LX, § 2, cl. 1 for equity in one claim and for adequacy
in the second claim).
42. Id. at 27 (citing N.C. CONST. art I, § 19, and arguing that "[slchoolchildren of this State are
entitled to adequate educational opportunities, which may not be withheld or eliminated except in
accordance with due process").
43. Id. at 27-29.
44. Telephone Interview with Robert Leandro, named plaintiff in Leandro v. State (Mar. 14, 2003)
[hereinafter Leandro Interview].
45. Id. He added, "When I got to college, I was especially intimidated by the thought of taking the
laboratory sciences because we had almost no lab equipment in my high school." Id.
46. Id.
47. Each county's real estate wealth varies depending on how much industry, agricultural land,
vacation homes, and primary residences are located within its borders. The adjusted tax base figure
describes how much taxable real estate wealth each county has at its disposal.
48. PUB. SCH. FORUM OF N.C., supra note 29, at 14-15, 20.
49. The plaintiff-intervenors included the school boards of Asheville, Buncombe, Durham, Forsyth,
Mecklenburg, and Wake counties, as well as children who were at the time enrolled in each school
system and their parents.
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on funding inequities. As the urban districts argued in their brief to the supreme
court:
The plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors have somewhat different perspectives on this
issue. The urban plaintiffs do not believe that district-by-district comparisons of
per-pupil funding shed much light on whether students in those school districts are
receiving equal educational opportunities. Such comparisons typically do not take
into account differences in the districts' student populations (which may
significantly affect education costs), external factors affecting the cost of providing
educational services (such as land and housing costs), or the availability of federal
funds (which tend to equalize the money available to relatively "rich" and relatively
"poor" school districts) 50
The intervenors were thus the first litigants to specifically raise the issue of at-
risk children with the North Carolina judiciary. 5' The plaintiff-intervenors also
claimed that the State's singling out of certain poor districts to receive
supplemental state funds was arbitrary and capricious, and therefore in
violation of the state constitution. 52 While this argument originally threatened
the collegial working relationship between the plaintiff parties, both the rural
and urban districts eventually unified around a common strategy focusing on
funding for at-risk children. Section III.C discusses rural-urban district
cooperation as one advantage of lawsuits focused on at-risk children across a
state rather than funding differentials among districts.
53
B. The Leandro Decision
In February of 1995, a trial court judge denied the State's motion to
dismiss.54 In March of 1996, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court, holding that the state constitution grants only equal access to public
schools. 55 Reversing the appellate court, however, the North Carolina Supreme
Court unanimously concluded that the constitution grants children the right to a
"sound basic education." 56 The court explained that an "education that does not
serve the purpose of preparing students to participate and compete in the
50. Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellants' New Brief at 20, Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997)
(No. 179PA96) (brief filed July 12, 1996) [hereinafter Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellants' New Briefi.
51. Telephone Interview with Audrey Anderson, plaintiff intervenors' attorney and Partner at
Hogan and Hartson, L.L.P. (Apr. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Anderson Interview] ("The whole focus of our
complaint was at-risk kids."); see also Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellants' New Brief , supra note 50, at 5
(noting the high number of intervenor schools in which a majority of students were eligible for free or
reduced-price lunches, and arguing that "providing an adequate education to these 'at-risk' children is
expensive because they often require educational services beyond those required for other children").
52. Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellants' New Brief, supra note 50, at 32 (arguing that the state's school
funding system violates the "general and uniform" requirement of the state education clause, as well as
the state equal protection clause, because "it arbitrarily distributes supplemental funds to some districts
but not to others with comparable or greater financial needs").
53. See infra Section III.C.
54. Leandro v. State, 468 S.E.2d 543, 543 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
55. Id. at 549.
56. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997).
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society in which they live and work is devoid of substance and is
constitutionally inadequate."
57
The court grounded its ruling in the two provisions of the state constitution
58that guarantee public education: Article I, § 15 and Article IX § 2. The court
also specifically provided a broad outline 59 of the essential components of a
"sound basic education":
1) sufficient ability to read, write, and speak the English language and a sufficient
knowledge of fundamental mathematics and physical science to enable the student
to function in a complex and rapidly changing society; 2) sufficient fundamental
knowledge of geography, history, and basic economic and political systems to
enable the student to make informed choices with regard to issues that affect the
student personally or affect the student's community, state, and nation; 3) sufficient
academic and vocational skills to enable the student to successfully engage in post-
secondary education or vocational training; and 4) sufficient academic and
vocational skills to enable the student to compete on an equal basis with others in
further formal education or gainful employment in contemporary society.
60
The supreme court then rejected plaintiffs' arguments that the constitution
requires equality of educational opportunities. 6 1 The court examined the "equal
opportunities" language of the education clause and, relying primarily on a
structural argument, concluded that this language could not possibly require
equal or substantially equal funding for the state's schools because Article IX,
Section 2, Clause 2 expressly states that local governments may use local
revenues to supplement their local school programs. 62 The court disposed of the
57. Id.
58. Id. at 255; see also N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15 ("The people have a right to the privilege of
education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right."); N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2
("The General Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system of
free public schools, which shall be maintained at least nine months in every year, and wherein equal
opportunities shall be provided for all students.").
59. Interview with Burley Mitchell, Jr., retired Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court,
in Raleigh, N.C. (Mar. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Mitchell Interview]. When asked how he thought courts
should determine the components of an adequate education, Mitchell responded: "You have to state
them in more general terms." Mitchell illustrated this point with a conversation he had with another
state's chief justice:
The chief justice of New Hampshire wrote one of these things, and he asked me, "Did you put
anything in there about computers?" And I said, "No I didn't." And he said, "Then your
decision cannot be any good then because computers are the wave of the future. If you don't
have computers then you don't have an education." And I said, "Look, computers are like lead
pencils, they are very temporary .... God knows what will be out there fifty years from
now.., what I said was that children had to be sufficiently conversant with science.., not
that they have to learn any particular type of technology."
Id.
60. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255.
61. Id. at 256. However, one justice dissented from this portion of the decision, arguing that the
majority assigned no significance to the 1970 addition of the phrase, "wherein equal opportunities shall
be provided for all students." Id. at 262 (Orr, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62. Id. at 256. This portion of the North Carolina Constitution reads:
The General Assembly may assign to units of local government such responsibility for the
financial support of the free public schools as it may deem appropriate. The governing boards
of units of local government with financial responsibility for public education may use local
revenues to add to or supplement any public school or post-secondary school program.
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low-wealth districts' equal protection claim with the same structural
argument. 63 It also noted that other states have faced problems after courts
recognized a right to equal education, and concluded that the North Carolina
Constitution could not impose "such an impractical or unattainable goal. ' 64
Finally, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' statutory claims, finding that the
statutes "at most, reiterate the constitutional requirement that every child in the
state have equal access to a sound basic education."
65
In order to give guidance to the trial court on remand, the supreme court
concluded the Leandro ruling by suggesting the factors that would determine
whether the state had denied children their right to a sound basic education.
Those factors were: the "[e]ducational goals and standards adopted by the
legislature;" 66 the "level of performance of the children of the state and its
various districts on standard achievement tests;" 67 and "the level of the state's
general educational expenditures and per pupil expenditures."
68
C. The Leandro Remand and Hoke County Rulings
After writing the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Leandro,
Chief Justice Burley Mitchell selected Wake County Superior Court Judge
Howard E. Manning, Jr. to hear the case on remand.69 Now with the name Hoke
County Board of Education v. State, the trial began in 1999. Judge Manning
bifurcated the case into one trial on the merits of the issues raised by the
plaintiff small, rural school districts, and a second trial on the merits of the
issues raised by the plaintiff-intervenor large, urban school districts.7" All
N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2, cl. 2.
63. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 258.
64. Id. at 257. Chief Justice Mitchell confirmed during his interview that the court was interested in
gleaning lessons from the experiences of other courts in dealing with school finance litigation:
I had a lot of opportunities to talk about the issues among the other chiefs at the national
conferences of chief justices. The biggest problem the states have run into with these
education decisions has been the vehement reactions of their legislatures when they went in
and told them how they had to budget. Tom Phillips, chief justice of Texas at the time I wrote
Leandro, had had to write three opinions and strike down two or three Texas budgets....
[T]hey got caught in the trap of going through item by item and saying, "you have to have x
percent of the budget directed to a certain thing." I just made up my mind that we were not
going to let that happen unless the legislature absolutely forced us to. So you do it
incrementally.
Mitchell Interview, supra note 59.
65. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 259.
66. Id. The supreme court also stated that the state's educational standards "will not be
determinative." Id. For a discussion of the role of legislative standards in school finance cases, see infra
Section 1IlA.
67. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 259. However, the court also stated that test results "may not be treated
as absolutely authoritative on this issue." Id. at 260.
68. Id.
69. Mitchell Interview, supra note 59.
70. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County I), No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 6 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000) (on file with author).
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71parties agreed that Hoke County would represent the low-wealth counties. In
the end, Judge Manning discarded the plan for a second trial since the attorneys
for the plaintiff-intervenors were allowed to participate in discovery, brief the
court, direct and cross-examine witnesses, and give closing arguments in the
Hoke County trial.72 Moreover, the court's rulings in the Hoke County trial
applied to all school districts, regardless of their urban or rural status.
73
Before commencing the trial and acting on its own motion, the court raised
the matter of the constitutional rights of pre-kindergarten aged children.74 Judge
Manning asked the plaintiff parties to amend their original complaints "to
assert claims on behalf of children of pre-kindergarten age to educational rights
under the North Carolina Constitution." 75  The plaintiffs and plaintiff-
intervenors both filed amended complaints alleging the need for pre-
kindergarten and other programs in order to provide children living in poverty
with the opportunity to receive a "sound basic education.' 76 The State filed a
71. Telephone Interview with Robert Tiller, Leandro plaintiffs' attorney and Partner at Parker, Poe,
Adams & Bernstein, L.L.P. (Mar. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Tiller Interview] ("We as counsel for
plaintiffs thought that Hoke would be a good choice because.., its economic situation was even more
dire than some of the other plaintiffs'. Interestingly, the State also nominated Hoke, perhaps also
thinking that its small size would simplify discovery.").
72. Hoke County I, slip op. at 6.
73. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County II), No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 84 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2001) (on file with author) ("Reduced to essentials, the plaintiffs and plaintiff-
intervenors have produced clear and convincing evidence that there are at-risk children in Hoke County
and throughout North Carolina who are, by virtue of the ABC's accountability system and other
measures, not obtaining a sound basic education."). 1
74. Interview with Howard E. Manning, Jr., Superior Court Judge, Wake County, in Raleigh, N.C.
(Mar. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Manning Interview] ("Early childhood education was an issue that wasn't
on the table, so I had them amend their complaints."). Judge Manning further explained that the pre-
kindergarten idea came to him as a result of experiences with sentencing in criminal cases:
The pre-k idea in my mind came about before I ever heard about this case. I would see every
day as a judge all of these kids-most of them black and most of them poor-all selling drugs
and all going to jail. And for all of them, highest grade completed in school? Eighth. You see
this constant barrage as a judge. I made up my mind that something is not right and you've got
to do something with them early.
Id.
75. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 3 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 9,
1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Order of Feb. 9, 1999].
76. The plaintiffs' amended complaint argued:
Many children living in poverty in plaintiff districts begin public school kindergarten at a
severe disadvantage. They do not have the basic skills and knowledge needed for kindergarten
and as a foundation for the remainder of elementary and secondary school .... The plaintiff
school districts do not have sufficient resources to provide the prekindergarten and other
programs and services needed for a sound basic education.
Id. at 3-4 (quoting Plaintiffs' Second Amendment to the Amended Complaint 74a, Hoke County Bd.
of Educ. v. State (No. 95 CVS 1158)). The plaintiff-intervenors' amended complaint argued:
A large number of students in the urban school districts require educational resources and
services in addition to those currently funded and available to them if they are to receive the
sound basic education required by the North Carolina Constitution. Examples of these
educational needs included, but are not limited to: pre-kindergarten programs and services;
reduced class sizes; appropriate training for teachers serving students who are mentally,
physically, economically or otherwise disadvantaged; dropout prevention programs; enhanced
remediation and academic enrichment programs for "at-risk" students; materials and services
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motion to dismiss both amendments to the complaints, arguing that, "children
who are younger than the statutory minimum age for attending public school
have no constitutional right to free public pre-kindergarten schooling."77 Judge
Manning denied the State's motion to dismiss, and instead held:
as a matter of law that under the Leandro doctrine and the North Carolina
Constitution, the right to an opportunity to receive a sound basic education in the
public schools is not to be conditioned upon age, but rather upon the need of the
particular child, including, if necessary, the right to early childhood education prior
to the child reaching the age of 5 and entering 5 year old kindergarten.
7 8
In this initial ruling, Judge Manning put forward perhaps the most significant
holding of Hoke County.
Later that year, the court held an initial trial that lasted twenty-one business
days between September and December of 1999. This trial included twenty-six
witnesses for the plaintiff parties, seventeen witnesses for the State, and 670
exhibits. 79 Issues such as educational standards and testing, social science
support for pre-kindergarten, and the efficacy of increased school expenditures
all featured prominently in the trial testimony. While the plaintiff parties
presented an expert witness who discussed the social science research
demonstrating the benefits of pre-kindergarten, the State presented no rebuttal
expert on this point.80 Instead, the State called Dr. Eric Hanushek, a prominent
economist who has testified in several states' school finance trials regarding his
meta-analyses showing that increased educational inputs have had little impact
on student achievement.
81
Six months after the conclusion of the trial, Judge Manning issued the first
of four memoranda of decision. The Dean of the University of North Carolina
Law School has described this series of decisions as "a legal Rorshach test," in
which "contesting parties, activists, public officials and commentators have
discovered widely divergent messages and directives in its pages. 82 Thus,
before describing each memorandum, the following list attempts to state
succinctly the major rulings in Hoke County v. North Carolina. The court held
appropriate for students with limited proficiency in the English language; and increased
counselling and guidance staff .... [T]he urban school boards lack sufficient resources to
serve both their high-needs and regular student populations.
Id. at 4 (citing Plaintiff-Intervenors' Amendment to the Intervening Complaint 50, Hoke County Bd.
of Educ. v. State (No. 95 CVS 1158)).
77. Order of Feb. 9, 1999, supra note 75, at 5 (citing State's motion to dismiss).
78. Id. at 6-7. -
79. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County I), No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 68 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000) (on file with author).
80. Anderson Interview, supra note 51.
81. Dr. Hanushek, Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the University of Rochester and a
Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institute, has written extensively on the topic of school
finance. See, e.g., Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance "Reform" May Not Be Good Policy, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423 (1991).
82. Gene R. Nichol, A Ruling for NC. 's Education, RALEIGH NEWS AND OBSERVER, Apr. 21,
2002, available at 2002 WL 11715462.
Vol. 22:525, 2004
At-Risk Children
that: 1) the minimum level of academic performance under Leandro is
performance at or above grade level as defined by Level III in the ABCs
program; 83 2) "those at-risk children, who are not presently in quality pre-
kindergarten educational programs, are being denied their fundamental
constitutional right to receive the equal opportunity to a sound basic
education"; 84 3) the State had failed to meet its constitutional burden to provide
a sound basic education to at-risk children throughout North Carolina; 85 4)
plaintiff parties had failed to meet their burden of showing that at-risk children
were not obtaining a sound basic education because of lack of sufficient
funding by the State of North Carolina;86 5) the State and individual school
districts must first spend existing resources on programs that satisfy Leandro's
constitutional mandate, even though doing so would mean that funds currently
spent "for any other educational purpose than to meet the constitutional
mandate ... must be reallocated;" 87 and 6) the State must remedy the
constitutional deficiencies for the at-risk children who are not receiving a sound
basic education, but left the "nuts and bolts" of the remedy for the legislative
and executive branches to determine.
88
In the first Hoke County memorandum of decision, Judge Manning
conducted a sweeping survey of the entire North Carolina public school system.
Although at this point the case was ostensibly about the Hoke County School
District, Judge Manning analyzed each of the following facets of the statewide
public education system in order to determine whether they were sufficient to
meet Leandro's mandate: 1) curriculum and standard course of study; 2)
teacher licensure and certification standards; 3) funding delivery system; and 4)
ABCs accountability program. After discussing each aspect in great detail, the
trial court ruled that each was constitutionally sound. 89 The court noted,
however, that its ruling did not necessarily mean that at-risk children are
actually receiving their constitutional right to a sound basic education, 90 leaving
that inquiry for a later decision.
Judge Manning also analyzed the State's student performance standards in
order to determine what weight they should be given in the court's
constitutional analysis. At trial, the State had contended that the constitutional
83. Hoke County I, slip op. at 11.
84. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County II), No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 45 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2001) (on file with author).
85. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County IV), No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 78 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2002) (on file with author).
86. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County II1), No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 84 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2001) (on file with author).
87. Id. at 4.
88. Hoke County IV, slip op. at 111.
89. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County 1), No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 120-22 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000) (on file with author).
90. Id.
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standard is so minimal that even children who perform below grade level, as
defined by Level II performance on the ABCs program End of Grade (EOG)
tests for grades three through eight, have been provided with the opportunity to
receive a "sound basic education." 91 The plaintiff parties had contended that the
minimum constitutional standard should be at least grade level (Level III or
above).92 Relying on the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction's
(DPI) own definitions of Level II and Level III performance, 93 Judge Manning
ruled for the plaintiff parties: "The Court has determined that the minimum
level of academic performance under Leandro is performance at or above grade
level performance as defined by the ABC's and DPI (Level III or above).
Academic performance below grade level (Level II) is a constitutionally
unacceptable minimum standard .... , In making this ruling, the court also
rejected the State's contentions that acquisition of a high school diploma after
passing North Carolina's High School Competency Test should be used to
judge whether children are receiving a sound basic education. 95 Instead, the
court reaffirmed that the Level III results on the ABCs program tests would be
"highly probative" in its constitutional analysis.
96
Two weeks later, Judge Manning issued his second installment of Hoke
County v. State, which focused predominantly on at-risk children and their
constitutional rights under Leandro. First, Judge Manning identified the factors
that constitute the court's definition of at-risk status: 1) poor health, beginning
as early as prenatal and continuing through childhood; 2) poverty; 3) family
break-up and instability; 4) low parental education; 5) inadequate or unstable
housing; 6) racial/ethnic minority status; 7) lack of English language
proficiency; 8) criminal activity in the school or neighborhood; and 9) parental
91. Id. at 10.
92. Id.
93. Level II performance on EOG tests is below grade level and defined as: "Students performing
at this level demonstrate inconsistent mastery of knowledge and skills in these subject areas and are
minimally prepared to be successful at the next grade level." Level III performance on EOG tests is
performance at or above grade level and defined as: "Students performing at this level consistently
demonstrate mastery of grade level subject matter and skills and are well prepared for the next grade
level." Id.
94. Id. at 11.
95. Id. at 102. The court noted that the State had rejected the idea of requiring students to pass a test
that would examine twelfth-grade-level skills in order to receive a high school diploma, and instead tied
its high school diploma to a test that examines only eighth-grade-level skills. Id.
96. Id. at 109. However, the court found:
[T]he fact that a student fails to demonstrate a satisfactory level of academic achievement,
e.g., a level of performance that indicates that the student is receiving a sound basic education
(performing at grade level or above Level III, or above) does not, in and of itself, prove that
the State has failed to provide that student the equal opportunity for a sound basic education or
that the opportunity to obtain a sound basic education does not exist in the student's school or
school system.
Id. at 98. Instead, the court noted, "The fact that many students fail to demonstrate a satisfactory level of
academic achievement within a school, or school system, may provide clear evidence that those students
are not receiving the opportunity for a sound basic education." Id.
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unemployment or underemployment. 97 The court did not specify whether a
student must hold only one or a certain number of these criteria in order to
classify as at-risk.98 The court did, however, reiterate its earlier ruling that
"those at-risk children, who are not presently in quality pre-kindergarten
educational programs, are being denied their fundamental constitutional right to
receive the equal opportunity to a sound basic education." 99 The court further
noted that its ruling "does not require the State of North Carolina to provide
every four (4) year old child with a pre-kindergarten program at state
expense." 100 The court explained its reasoning for limiting the constitutional
right to at-risk students:
After examining the evidence and weighing the credibility of the witnesses, the
Court is convinced that the most common sense and practical solution to the
problem of providing at-risk children with an equal opportunity to obtain a sound
basic education is for them to begin their opportunity to receive that education
earlier than age (5) five so that those children can reach the end of the third grade
able to read, do math, or achieve academic performance at or above grade level
(Level III or above). More is needed sooner to give these children a chance to start
their education on equal level with their non at-risk counterparts. 
10 1
Judge Manning supported the pre-kindergarten ruling by pointing to
intuition, 102 the State's own position on the benefits of pre-kindergarten, 0 3 and
social science evidence.'
0 4
The court next examined the educational opportunities offered to at-risk
children in the representative plaintiff county. The court noted that during the
1998-99 school year, the Hoke County Schools had three pre-kindergarten
classrooms with eighteen students in each, for a total of fifty-four slots.
However, 348 Hoke pre-kindergarten-aged students qualified as at-risk.
0 5
According to testimony heard in the trial, expanding the pre-kindergarten
program to meet the court's requirements, in Hoke County alone, would require
seventeen additional teachers at a cost of $1,103,784, plus capital costs for
97. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County II), No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 45 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2001) (on file with author).
98. See id.
99. Id. at 45.
100. Id. at 46.
101. Id.at2l.
102. The ruling explained:
When these children came to kindergarten at age 5, they were at-risk, already behind, not
ready to learn and certainly not in a position to take advantage of the opportunity to begin the
process to obtain a sound basic education on an equal footing with their fellow five[-]year[-]
old students who were not encumbered by outside at-risk factors.
Id. at 26.
103. The State Board chairman, testifying for the State, admitted that it is a "no brainer" that pre-
kindergarten education would be a helpful way to address the needs of disadvantaged children. Id. at 29.
104. "The studies generally concluded that the pre-school programs provide both long[-]term and
short-term positive effects on children's development and academic achievement." Id. at 32.
105. Id. at 38.
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classrooms, equipment and supplies.' °6 Rather than directly ordering the State
to increase funds by that amount, the court left the "nuts and bolts and
implementation of the expansion of pre-kindergarten educational programs for
at-risk children" up to the legislative and executive branches of government.'
07
In March of 2001, Judge Manning issued his third installment of the Hoke
County decision. After discussing the large number of underachieving students
in Hoke County schools,' 08 Judge Manning expanded his inquiry to the students
of the entire state, finding that "there are two distinct groups of students in
North Carolina's Public Schools-those at-risk and those not at-risk." 10 9 In so
doing, the court officially shifted the litigation's emphasis away from the low-
wealth versus high-wealth dichotomy that had been the basis of the plaintiffs'
original complaint. The court noted that at-risk children perform just as poorly
in the highest spending school districts as they do in the lowest spending
districts."' 0 Judge Manning concluded that "the huge sums of money that the
State of North Carolina channels into each [school district] are not being
strategically and logically directed and spent in the best manner possible to
accomplish the mandate of Leandro."I'II In the plaintiff parties' first setback,
the court ruled:
[Tlhe plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors have produced clear and convincing
evidence that there are at-risk children in Hoke County and throughout North
Carolina who are, by virtue of the ABCs accountability system and other measures,
not obtaining a sound basic education.
What they have not yet proved.., is that the failure of at-risk children (the
issue of pre-kindergarten aside) to obtain a sound basic education is the result of
lack of sufficient funding by the State of North Carolina.
1 12
The trial court's holding regarding current funding levels criticized what it
deemed "[p]alatial central offices and high salaries for non teaching
administrators," 113 as well as the "frills and whistles" of advanced educational
courses for students who are not at-risk. 14 Judge Manning suggested that
existing funds must be reallocated to offer at-risk children a sound basic
education before additional resources could be spent on programs that go above
106. Id.
107. Id. at 46.
108. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County III), No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 17 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2001) (on file with author).
109. Id. at 68.
110. Id. at 78 ("Why do the at-risk children continue to perform so poorly in both the dirt poor
counties and the 'wealthy' counties ... ?").
111. Id. at 79.
112. Id.at84.
113. Id. at 87 (finding that such offices and salaries "are not constitutionally mandated" and that the
"tax money that is spent must first be spent to properly educate the at-risk children that are failing to
achieve grade level proficiency").
114. Id. at 82 ("While there is no restriction on high-level electives, modem dance, advanced
computer courses and multiple foreign language courses being taught or paid for by tax dollars... the
Constitutional guarantee of a sound basic education for each child must first be met.").
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and beyond a sound basic education. 1 5 Having found the total amount of
school funding in North Carolina to meet constitutional requirements, the court
nevertheless ordered the State to work with the plaintiff parties to "conduct
self-examinations of the present allocation of resources" and develop within
twelve months a plan that addresses the needs of at-risk students."l
6
Judge Manning's third memorandum pleased no one. The plaintiff parties
and other education advocates were disappointed that the trial court had not
ordered an increase in school funding," 17 and the State was displeased with the
court's order regarding the reallocation plan. As one State official said, "We'll
continue to emphasize helping at-risk students ... but we emphatically reject
any notion that it be done at the expense of brighter students . , . 18 The State
filed notice of appeal on April 24, 2001,119 but Judge Manning prevented the
appeal by suddenly announcing that his first three memoranda of decision had
been interlocutory orders.' 20 Manning then deleted the order requiring the State
to write a reallocation plan, and he announced plans for ten additional days of
evidentiary hearings with the purpose of highlighting low-wealth schools that
were achieving strong results for at-risk students.'
2
'
Over a year later, in April 2002, the trial court issued its final
memorandum. According to Judge Manning, the additional hearings had
demonstrated the benefits to at-risk students of reducing class size, providing
tutoring and more "time on task," and having competent principals and
teachers.' 22 Therefore, the court held that the State bears the ultimate
responsibility of ensuring that all school districts provide these resources to
their at-risk children. 23 The court even seemed to soften its position, though
only slightly, on the need for additional funds:
The State must step in with an iron hand and get the mess straight. If it takes
removing an ineffective Superintendent, Principal, teacher, or group of teachers and
115. Id. at 4. The court explained:
[S]chool systems and the State must first put in place programs that provide all children with
the equal opportunity to obtain a sound basic education and that if the funding that is
appropriated from whatever source is being used for any other educational purpose than to




117. Doman Interview, supra note 34 ("Most of the educational community is not thrilled with
Judge Manning's ambivalence about whether money matters.").
118. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County IV), No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 14 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2002) (on file with author) (quoting RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Apr. 24, 2001, at
1A).
119. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 5 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 29,
2001) (on file with author) (Order Amending Memorandum of Decision of Mar. 26, 2001).
120. Manning Interview, supra note 74.
121. Id.
122. Hoke County IV, slip op. at 29-31.
123. Id. at 109-11.
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putting effective, competent ones in their place, so be it. If the deficiencies are due
to a lack of effective management practices, then it is the State's responsibility to
see that effective management practices are put in place.
The State of North Carolina cannot shirk or delegate its ultimate responsibility
to provide each and every child in the State with the equal opportunity to obtain a
sound basic education, even if it requires the State to spend additional monies to do
124
SO.
Despite this language, the court never directly ordered the State to appropriate
more money to public schools. Moreover, the court reaffirmed all of the prior
rulings from the first three memoranda, including the holding that plaintiffs had
failed to show that current school funding levels were constitutionally
inadequate. 125
Several legal observers interpreted this fourth memorandum as a
clarification of Judge Manning's position on reallocating resources.126 Attorney
Anderson, for example, noted that "Judge Manning did a nice job of quelling
the perception that the rights of rich kids were against the rights of poor
kids."12 7 Indeed, the court specifically addressed the critics of the reallocation
suggestion, including some by name, and wrote that their concerns "reflected a
fundamental misconception about Leandro's guarantee of an equal opportunity
to receive a sound basic education to each and every child in the state...
including the 'best and the brightest."' 1 28 However, even this clarification
leaves unanswered questions. After 371 pages in four Hoke County memoranda
of decision, it remains uncertain exactly how, and with which funds, schools
will provide a remedy to the thousands of at-risk children throughout North
Carolina who still have no access to pre-kindergarten classes.
In January 2003, the State appealed the Hoke County rulings and presented
the following three questions for review:
I. Did the trial court apply the wrong standards for determining when a student has
obtained a sound basic education, for determining causation and for determining
Defendants' liability?
II. Did the trial court err when it held that pre-kindergarten programs are
constitutionally required for at-risk students?
III. Is the proper age at which children should be permitted to attend public schools
a nonjusticiable political question reserved to the General Assembly?
124. Id. at 108.
125. Id. at 31 ("None of the credible evidence received at the hearings ... persuaded the court to
change or amend its determinations and findings contained in the first three memoranda of decision.").
126. Doman Interview, supra note 34 (describing the fourth memorandum of decision as a
"clarification" and a "retreat"); Hancock Interview, supra note 27 ("In the last of the four opinions,
Judge Manning clarified that the adequacy standard applied not only to at-risk children but to all
children.").
127. Anderson Interview, supra note 51 ("There was a political outcry in March 2001, when the
State took the decision to mean that all schools would have to cut AP classes. However, Manning says in
Part Four that that is not what he meant. He says that everybody has to be able to compete.").
128. Hoke County IV, slip op. at 11.
129. Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 16, at 1.
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Several months later, the North Carolina Supreme Court granted the case
expedited review, thus allowing it to bypass the state court of appeals. 130 The
court held oral arguments in September 2003,131 but had not issued a ruling as
of the time that this Essay went to print. If upheld, the Hoke County ruling will
situate the North Carolina school finance litigation near the forefront of the
school finance reform movement in several respects. Part III of this Essay
discusses several of the Leandro litigation's more pioneering features.
III. ANALYSIS: LEANDRO LITIGATION AS A NATIONAL TRENDSETTER
The Leandro litigation offers observers and litigators of school finance
cases several important lessons. Section A discusses how the Leandro plaintiffs
successfully utilized the state's standards and accountability program to aid
their litigation efforts. Section B analyzes the reasons why race did not become
a divisive factor in the lawsuit. Section C examines the lawsuit's evolution
toward the concept of vertical equity, and suggests that school finance attorneys
might find important advantages by focusing future lawsuits specifically on at-
risk students. Finally, Section D concludes by predicting a new trend of pre-
kindergarten as a remedy in school finance cases in other states.
A. Leandro and Legislatively-Enacted Education Standards and Testing
The standards-based accountability movement was launched at a 1989
National Education Summit when President George H.W. Bush and the
members of the National Governors' Association-led by then-Governor Bill
Clinton-agreed to push for a new framework of educational standards that
would define and test the baseline of academic achievement for all students.
Since then, standards-based accountability has become the most far-reaching
education reform movement in recent decades. 32 Also in 1989, school finance
litigation entered its "third wave" when the Kentucky Supreme Court found a
right to an adequate education, rather than equal funding, under the education
clause of its constitution.' 33 Less than a decade later, these two reform
movements fully intersected in the Leandro litigation. In fact, the North
Carolina courts perhaps have relied on state education standards and testing
130. N.C. Supreme Court Takes Leandro Case, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Mar. 19, 2003, at
B8.
131. William L. Holmes, State Wants High Court To Toss Schools Suit; Ruling Could Undo
Reforms Ordered for Poor Systems, DURHAM HERALD-SUN, Sept. 11, 2003, at A2.
132. As of 2001, all states except for Iowa had adopted some form of standards-based
accountability system. Kathryn M. Doherty, Standards, EDUC. WK., at http://www.edweek.com/context/
topics/issuespage.cfm?id 55 (last modified Apr. 8, 2004). Indeed, President Clinton's Secretary of
Education, Richard W. Riley, commented, "At the end of our term," standards-based reform "was an
irreversible nationwide movement." Erik W. Robelen, Secretaries' Day: Agency Heads Mull State of
Education, EDUC. WK., Feb. 27, 2002, at 21.
133. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
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more heavily than any other state judiciary to date for the purpose of defining
and gauging the constitutional right to an adequate education.' 
34
A number of legal scholars have argued that state education standards
would benefit plaintiffs' efforts in adequacy-oriented school finance reform
litigation.1 35 Molly S. McUsic commented that, "Adequacy claims owe their
growing strength to the trend.., of defining explicit educational standards for
public schools, commonly in the form of end-of-year tests given to each grade
level."'' 36 Legislatively-enacted standards allow courts to overcome judicial
competency concerns when they are asked by plaintiffs to address the complex
issue of what constitutes adequate student achievement.' 37 The Leandro
litigation demonstrates this phenomenon well. In 1996, the State questioned the
competency of judges to determine educational adequacy when it argued to the
supreme court that "it is clear that there are no judicially manageable and
discoverable standards for determining what an adequate education is, when
and to whom it is not being provided, and how a failure to provide it can be
remedied."' 138 In response, the plaintiffs cited the State's own efforts at
standards-based reform as a reliable standard. In fact, even before the
Department of Public Instruction fully developed the ABCs program, the
Leandro plaintiffs used the future existence of the standards to their advantage,
arguing in a brief to the North Carolina Supreme Court:
[A] state commission is currently developing "clearly defined education standards
for the public schools of North Carolina" with "the skills and knowledge that high
school graduates should possess in order to be competitive in the modem
economy." This commission's work, once completed, is likely to be of assistance to
134. See infra notes 155-165 and accompanying text (comparing the North Carolina courts' use of
a standards and accountability system with that of the New York, Kansas, and Alabama state courts).
135. See, e.g., Michael Heise, The Courts, Educational Policy, and Unintended Consequences, 11
CORNELL J.L. & POL'Y 633, 634 (2002) ("The transition of school finance litigation from an equity to an
adequacy mooring, initiated in 1989, facilitated an interaction with standards and assessments policy.");
see also James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political Reconstruction, Liberal
Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 VA. L. REv. 349, 428 (1990) ("By
enacting stricter and more comprehensive minimum educational standards, the states have absolved the
courts of some of the difficult tasks that in the past have discouraged them from entering the adequate-
education field and have afforded plaintiffs a doctrinally easier, if not yet easy, row to hoe.").
136. Molly S. McUsic, The Promises and Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAW AND
SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 88, 91 (Jay P. Heubert ed.,
1999).
137. Id. at 90. McUsic contends:
This approach clarifies the legal complaint by relying not on the plaintiff, defendant, or the
judge for a definition of 'adequate education,' but on the policy established by education
experts and endorsed by the legislature or the state department of education. As a result, the
judge is expected to decide not the state's educational policy, but only whether the state is
adhering to that policy.
Id. at 91; see also William F. Dietz, Note, Manageable Adequacy Standards in Education Reform
Litigation, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1193, 1223 (1996) ("Existing standards are the most institutionally sound
method for courts to enunciate a state's duty without stepping outside their role as interpreter of
constitutions.").
138. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 14, Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997) (No.
179PA96) (brief filed July 12, 1996).
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the trial court in addressing the challenge here.
139
The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs on this issue,
noting in the Leandro decision that "Educational goals and standards adopted
by the legislature are factors which may be considered on remand to the trial
court for its determination as to whether any of the state's children are being
denied their right to a sound basic education."'
140
When Chief Justice Mitchell and Judge Manning were asked if the
existence of North Carolina's education standards made the tasks of ruling and
writing decisions in this case easier for them, they responded "Absolutely'
' 4 1
and "Damn Right,"'142 respectively. Mitchell explained that courts gain a sort of
democratic legitimacy in their educational adequacy rulings by adopting
legislatively-enacted standards:
Courts can look at what the legislatures have done, and do so recognizing that they
have had the opportunity to hear from everybody and to thrash it out in open
hearings, unconstrained by the case and controversy limitations. It does give the
judge some guidelines and, at least, reassurance.143
Judge Manning described the standards program as instrumental in his task of
gauging constitutional adequacy, commenting that, "The ABCs are a great tool,
and without it, I couldn't have done it. I would have had to have said [to the
State], you've got to have an accountability system, because we can't measure
your results from what you tell us." 144 Indeed, Judge Manning's ruling in Hoke
County seems to elevate the existence of a standards-based accountability
system to the level of a constitutional requirement.1
45
Though unsuccessful in Leandro, the plaintiff parties' litigation strategy
suggests that standards-based accountability programs might also help address
the concerns of judges who look skeptically upon school finance litigation out
of concern that increased funding would not lead to increased student
achievement. l6.As noted earlier, Dr. Eric Hanushek testified for the State in
the Hoke County trial about his extensive meta-research that shows no
correlation between increased school inputs and outputs. 147 According to
139. Plaintiff-Appellee's New Brief at 12 n.7, Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997) (No.
179PA96) (brief filed Aug. 23, 1996) (citations omitted).
140. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 259 (N.C. 1997).
141. Mitchell Interview, supra note 59.
142. Manning Interview, supra note 74.
143. Mitchell Interview, supra note 59.
144. Manning Interview, supra note 74.
145. "If the ABCs program were not in place, a similar accountability program would, in the
Court's opinion, be required." Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County I), No. 95 CVS 1158,
slip op. at 90 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000) (on file with author).
146. In fact, the State seems to have conceded this point in its most recent brief, acknowledging,
"By tying rewards to student test results, the ABCs provides incentives for local boards to effectively
manage resources in their systems to improve academic performance." Brief for Defendant-Appellants,
supra note 16, at 9.
147. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff-intervenors' attorney Audrey Anderson, who cross-examined
Hanushek in the trial:
The accountability system in North Carolina also helped us blunt the force of
Hanushek's work. He writes that a big problem with spending additional money is
that schools have no incentive to spend it in such a way so as to improve student
achievement. He admitted that in North Carolina with the accountability system,
schools do have an incentive to spend money so as to improve student achievement,
at least to get as many kids as possible to proficiency. 
4 8
In the end, however, Judge Manning apparently did not find the presence of the
ABCs program to be a sufficiently compelling safeguard to order increased
school funds in this case. 14 9 This result may reflect the predisposition of this
one judge,' 50 however, rather than the likelihood that the strategy will be
effective in other state courts, where litigators might strengthen their cases by
contending that standards-based accountability systems create the context in
which court-ordered increases in funding can actually improve student
achievement.
The use of state standards in adequacy litigation, however, is not without
limits. Education law scholars on both sides of the standards issue have raised
concerns about judicial reliance on legislative standards, with some arguing
that the standards potentially are set too low to fulfill constitutional mandates
and others arguing that the standards potentially are set too high. Several
scholars have expressed concern that "allowing [legislative standards] to define
or limit the constitutional contours of educational adequacy would render
constitutional mandates meaningless."' 5' Indeed, in response to recent changes
in federal education laws, some states have begun to lower the requirements of
their standards and accountability systems.'5 2 If this trend continues, courts
may find state standards less reliable for use in constitutional analysis. For
these reasons, Chief Justice Mitchell cautioned that courts should not fully hand
over the responsibility of enunciating the constitutional right to the legislatures:
"I don't think standards are necessarily determinative [of the constitutional
issue]. If they are set too low, I think there is still a place for the courts to step
in and say we have to do better than that."'
153
148. Anderson Interview, supra note 51.
149. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County III), No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 84 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2001) (on file with author) ("What [plaintiff parties] have not yet proved... is that
the failure of at-risk children (the issue of pre-kindergarten aside) to obtain a sound basic education is
the result of lack of sufficient funding by the State of North Carolina.").
150. Manning Interview, supra note 74 ("You're never going to get a blank check from me.").
151. Martha I. Morgan et al., Establishing Education Program Inadequacy: The Alabama Example,
28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 559, 591 (1995).
152. Sam Dillon, States Are Relaxing Education Standards to Avoid Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, May
22, 2003, at A29 (describing the recent Texas decision to reduce the number of questions a student must
answer correctly in order to pass the State's achievement test, and noting that "[e]ducators in other states
have been making similar decisions as they seek to avoid the penalties that the federal law imposes on
schools whose students fare poorly on standardized tests.").
153. Mitchell Interview, supra note 59; see also Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County
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While Mitchell's response solves the problem of excessively low legislative
standards, it still leaves the complaints of those who note that legislatures might
choose to set statutory mandates above constitutional mandates. James S.
Liebman raises the question, "Particularly in an era of strict statutory
interpretation, are judges likely-and should they be encouraged-to interpret
every expression of aspirational educational policy as an enforceable
commitment to effectuate that policy? ' 154 In the New York school funding
litigation, for example, the state's highest court citied this very concern in
rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments in favor of using state standards as the
constitutional benchmark. 155 In response, litigants in other states will have to
convince courts that they are only holding state governments to what the states
themselves have defined as educational proficiency. This argument might gain
strength as states increasingly place the significant consequences of standards-
based accountability programs on individual children. 56 Nineteen states now
require students to pass an exit exam in order to earn a high school diploma.
1 57
In North Carolina, students who do not score Level III or above on their third,
fifth, and eighth grade EOG tests risk non-promotion to the next grade. 58 As
this "high-stakes testing" trend continues, courts may no longer be able to
claim credibly that state education standards constitute only aspirational goals.
As Jonthan Sher of the North Carolina Child Advocacy Center argues,
"Specific legislative mandates, complete with consequences for children who
fail to comply with the mandates, are not the same thing as campaign rhetoric
or other expressions of our collective hopes and dreams."'
' 59
While some other state judiciaries have utilized legislatively-enacted
education standards in their education decisions, none have used them as boldly
I), No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 115 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000) (on file with author) ("There is no
credible evidence that the [ABC] standards were set too low as compared to the standards of
achievement sufficient to obtain a sound basic education .... There is one thing for sure, however, the
standard of performance now in place may not be lowered.").
154. Liebman, supra note 135, at 384-85.
155. In 1995, New York's highest court held that
because many of the Regents' and Commissioner's standards exceed notions of a minimally
adequate or sound basic education-some are also aspirational-prudence should govern
utilization of the Regents' standards as benchmarks of educational adequacy. Proof of
noncompliance with one or more of the Regents' or Commissioner's standards may not,
standing alone, establish a violation of the Education Article.
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE 1), 86 N.Y.2d 307, 317 (1995). Moreover, ruling again in
the same case last year, the New York court reaffirmed its decision to reject the state standards as the
constitutional floor. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (CFE II), 801 N.E.2d 326 (2003).
156. See, e.g., ASSOCIATED PRESS, 13,000 Seniors Fail Florida School Test, SEATTLE TIMES, May
20, 2003, at A5 (describing how thousands of high school seniors will not receive high school diplomas
because they failed a newly required state achievement test).
157. Kathryn Doherty & Ronald Skinner, Quality Counts 2003: Introduction: State of the States,
EDUC. WK., Jan. 9, 2003, at 75.
158. N. C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, r. 6D.0502 (LEXIS through Mar. 2004).
159. Interview with Jonathan Sher, Executive Director, North Carolina Child Advocacy Center, in
Raleigh, N.C. (Mar. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Sher Interview].
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as the North Carolina courts. For example, the Kansas Supreme Court looked to
state standards to give meaning to the state constitution's education clause,'
60
but it relied only on the legislature's broad goals such as "communication skills
necessary to live, learn, and work in a global society" rather than specific
content standards and a corresponding testing system. Without discussion,
the Kansas court held that the State's school funding system satisfied these
lofty and imprecise statutory goals.' 62 The plaintiffs' loss in the Kansas lawsuit
suggests that litigators are more likely to succeed in holding states accountable
for their legislatively-enacted education goals when those standards are written
with greater specificity.
The Leandro plaintiffs' standards-based legal strategy "carve[s] new legal
terrain in how they leverage policy in the courtroom."' 63 While the Alabama
Supreme Court noted the testimony of an expert who discussed different
passing rates in low-wealth and high-wealth school districts,164 it did not
specifically link test results to the trigger of the constitutional violation.165 In
comparison, North Carolina's Hoke County ruling utilized test results in more
than a merely evidentiary fashion, and essentially allowed the End of Grade test
results to define the constitutional floor. Judge Manning not only held that test
results are "highly probative" in determining a constitutional violation,' 66 he
also found that: "A student who is performing below grade level (as defined by
Level I or II) is not obtaining a sound basic education under the Leandro
standard. A student who is performing at grade level or above (as defined by
Level III or IV) is obtaining a sound basic education under the Leandro
standard."'' 67 Such a bright-line rule would seem to create the equivalent of a
constitutional education malpractice lawsuit for individual students. However,
the court later softened its absolute stance on the role of an individual student's
160. "[T]he court will not substitute its judgment of what is 'suitable,' but will utilize as a base the
standards enunciated by the legislature and the state department of education." Unified Sch. Dist. No.
229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170, 1186 (Kan. 1994) (upholding the state's system of school funding).
161. Id. at 1187 (internal quotation marks omitted).
162. Id.
163. Heise, supra note 135, at 641.
164. Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107 app. at 123 (Ala. 1993) (reprinting Ala. Coalition for
Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, No. CV-90-883-R (Ala. Cir. Ct. Apr. 1, 1993)).
165. Id. The Alabama Supreme Court also based its ruling in part on legislatively enacted standards
concerning school inputs such as facilities, textbooks and supplies. Id. at 134. However, this strategy
will not aid school finance litigants elsewhere since the states have almost uniformly refused to adopt
such input standards. See William S. Koski, Educational Opportunity and Accountability in the Era of
Standards-Based School Reform, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 301, 318 n.14 (2001) (citing a policy
survey that noted that "in most of [the states], opportunity-to-learn standards were not on the policy
agenda").
166. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County I), No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 109 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000) (on file with author). Indeed, according to a news account of the trial, he told
the courtroom, "Now when we come to Hoke County, something's wrong somewhere, if you look at the
test results." Dennis Paterson, Judge Seeks Clarity in Schools Suit, DURHAM HERALD-SUN, Dec. 18,
1999, at B4.
167. Hoke County 1, slip op. at 116-17.
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test scores in demonstrating a constitutional violation, suggesting instead that
test results should be used to judge the progress of cohorts of students rather
than individual students.1 68 Nevertheless, if the Hoke County ruling on test
scores is upheld,169 it provides the Leandro litigants with a persuasive, though
not determinative, tool for advocating for more resources for North Carolina's
children.
Since North Carolina has been at the forefront of state efforts to develop
standards and testing, the state was a logical location for such a strong merging
of standards-based reform and adequacy litigation. According to attorney
Audrey Anderson:
In North Carolina, they're really ahead of many other states in accountability and
testing, so we were able to use that. This is great evidence for us because it's
something that the State itself has put into place, and what better standard then what
the State has itself determined is necessary to allow students to be productive
members of society.170
Anderson also predicts that "the use of standards in these cases is at the start of
the curve. The North Carolina decision is a trendsetter."' 7 1 If this trend
continues, school finance litigators might successfully expand current notions
of educational accountability. As one scholar described the potential
phenomenon, "[S]tate education clauses and state standards legislation feed off
each other--constitutional guarantees put the muscle behind statutory
promises, while statutory promises define the contours of constitutional
guarantees."' 72 This reciprocal relationship between constitutional rights and
legislative standards could lead to a comparable reciprocity between students
and their state governments: just as states currently hold students and schools
accountable for reaching certain performance standards, students could begin to
hold state governments accountable for providing enough funds to allow them
to actually reach those standards.
B. Leandro Litigation Escapes the Racial Lens
The Leandro plaintiffs successfully avoided the racial undertones of school
finance claims that have created fierce opposition to efforts to equalize
educational opportunities in other states. Polling research in New Jersey and
Texas measuring reaction to their school finance lawsuits shows that white
168. Id. at 119 ("A school or school system that has 90% of its children scoring at Levell III or
above would certainly be found in compliance with Leandro even as to the 10% who did not achieve the
sound basic education.").
169. The State argued in its brief to the North Carolina Supreme Court that this portion of the Hoke
County ruling goes beyond the Leandro holding that test scores may not be treated as "absolutely
authoritative." Brief for Defendant-Appellants, supra note 16, at 31 (citations omitted).
170. Anderson Interview, supra note 51.
171. Id.
172. Koski, supra note 165, at 314.
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citizens in both states inaccurately perceived school finance reform as primarily
benefiting minorities, even when successful litigation would have led to
increased funding for their own schools. 73 Indeed, compared to their more
integrated counterparts, minority districts in school finance cases have been
significantly less successful in court and, when successful, they have faced
more recalcitrance from state legislatures during the remedy-implementation
process. 1
74
This type of racially divisive scenario could have occurred in North
Carolina since many of the districts seeking additional funding had
disproportionately-high minority student populations.175 For example, the Hoke
County School System is composed of more than seventy percent students of
color. 176  However, the Leandro litigants appear to have succeeded in
neutralizing the race issue. Indeed, of all the individuals interviewed for this
case study-including the named plaintiff,177 litigating attorneys,
178 judges, 179
state legislators,' 80  professors,' 81 and representatives of North Carolina
173. See James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MIC4. L. REV. 432,
432 (1999) (citing Douglas S. Reed, Twenty-Five Years After Rodriguez: School Finance Litigation and
the Impact of the New Judicial Federalism, 32 L. & SOC'Y REV. 175, 209 (1998); Kent L. Tedin, Self-
Interest, Symbolic Values, and the Financial Equalization of the Public Schools, 56 J. POL. 628 (1994));
see also Melissa C. Carr & Susan H. Furham, The Politics of School Finance in the 1990s, in EQUITY
AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE 136, 139 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999) ("To the extent that
towns and school districts are segregated along racial, ethnic, religious or socioeconomic lines,
corresponding prejudices often enter the politics of school finance.").
174. Ryan, supra note 173, at 455. Ryan notes that "predominantly minority districts have won
only three of the twelve school finance challenges (25%) in which they were plaintiffs. Predominantly
white districts, by contrast, have won eleven of fifteen cases (73%)." Id. at 433. He further observed that
minority districts winning school finance cases have "encountered legislative recalcitrance that exceeds,
in both intensity and duration, the legislative resistance that successful white districts have faced." Id.
175. See N.C. DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, supra note 9, at 19 tbl.12. The total public school
population in North Carolina was 60.2 percent white and 39.8 percent students of color. In comparison,
the total public school population in the eleven plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenor school districts was only
48.7 percent white and 51.3 percent students of color. See id. Nevertheless, the plaintiff parties may
actually have benefited from a public perception that conflates urban poverty with race. As Anderson
suggested, "It was helpful to have the subject district [in the remanded trial] be Hoke County where
poverty is not associated in people's minds with race." Anderson Interview, supra note 51.
176. See N.C. DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, supra note 9, at 20 tbl. 12.
177. Leandro Interview, supra note 44 (responding "No" when asked if he observed any racial
undertones in the public reaction to the litigation).
178. Anderson Interview, supra note 51 ("I didn't feel there was even a sub-text of race.");
Hancock Interview, supra note 27 ("1 do not think race has played a role in this case, at least not in any
way that I have seen."); Tiller Interview, supra note 71 ("Race has never been polarizing in this case.").
179. Manning Interview, supra note 74 ("This is not a race case. North Carolina is well past all of
that. This affects every single child regardless of color."); Mitchell Interview, supra note 59 ("I think it's
almost unknowable. If race has some part in it, I think it would be impossible to calculate what it is....
But this issue does not lend itself to demagoguery the way that racial integration did. Who in America
can you get to admit that they believe that kids do not have a right to a sound basic education?").
180. Telephone Interview with Deborah Ross, State Representative and Education Committee
member (Mar. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Ross Interview] (responding "No" when asked if she observed any
racial undertones in the public reaction to the litigation).
181. Telephone Interview with Ferrel Guillory, Professor and Founder, Program on Southern
Politics, Media and Public Life, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Feb. 19, 2003) ("1 don't
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education advocacy groups and civil rights organizations' 82-not one felt that
race had played an explicit or even underlying role in the public, legislative, or
judicial reaction to Leandro.
The Leandro attorneys' legal and political strategy revolved around income
issues rather than race-specific claims, an approach that may explain how they
neutralized the race issue when lawsuits in other states did not.' 83 As plaintiffs'
attorney Robert Tiller commented, "From the very beginning of this litigation,
we presented these issues as problems that crossed racial lines. They broke
down principally in terms of haves versus have-nots, rather than blacks versus
whites."' 84 Indeed, the press release written by the plaintiffs' attorneys on the
day the Leandro case was filed never once mentions race or racial disparities in
educational inputs or achievement.' 85 Moreover, unlike litigants in other states,
the Leandro plaintiffs did not bring a federal claim of racially disparate impact
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964186 or seek the co-counsel of civil
rights organizations that traditionally advocate for people of color.' 87 Several
representatives of North Carolina education advocacy and civil rights
organizations expressed mild frustration with this strategy, but they also
seemed to understand that an increased focus on racial issues might have made
the litigation more controversial. 188 Attorney Tiller concluded:
think that the debate over Smart Start or More at Four or even Judge Manning's ruling breaks clearly
along racial lines. It's more along the lines of role of government.").
182. E-mail from John Doman, Executive Director, Public School Forum of North Carolina (Feb.
14, 2003, 14:40:09 EST) (on file with author) ("I have not seen this portrayed as a race case, rather it is
commonly viewed as a class/income case."); Interview with Gregory Malhoit, Director and attorney,
Rural Education Finance Center, in Raleigh, N.C. (Mar. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Malhoit Interview]
("That didn't happen here. Race was not seen as an issue."); see also Interview with Sheria Reid,
Attorney, North Carolina Justice Center, in Raleigh, N.C. (Mar. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Reid Interview];
Interview with Gladys Robinson, Education Chair of the North Carolina NAACP, in Chapel Hill, N.C.
(Mar. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Robinson Interview].
183. Spearman, supra note 36 ("We did not try to cast it as a racial case .... "); see also Sher
Interview, supra note 159.
184. Tiller Interview, supra note 71.
185. Press Release, Robert W. Spearman & Robert H. Tiller, Plaintiffs' Attorneys (May 25, 1994)
(on file with author).
186. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 295 A.D.2d. 1, 19 (2002) (overturning the trial
court ruling in favor of plaintiffs' Title VI claim in light of Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)
(holding that there exists no private right of action to enforce Title VI regulations)).
187. For example, the Texas litigation, which received an adverse public reaction along racial lines,
see supra note 173, was brought by the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund. J.
Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest for Education Equity, 17
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 607, 626 (1999). With regard to the North Carolina litigation, Dr. Jonathan Sher
of the North Carolina Child Advocacy Center observed: "I think one thing that has prevented it from
being a racial issue is that there is not a clear black advocate for this. It wasn't brought by the NAACP
or equivalent organizations." Sher Interview, supra note 159.
188. According to Attorney Sheria Reid of the North Carolina Justice Center, which has filed
amicus briefs on behalf of the plaintiffs at various stages of this litigation, "There really weren't any
minority organizations [involved in the case] at all. They overlooked the Native American groups, the
Hispanic groups, and the NAACP. I do think the plaintiffs were trying to keep it from turning into a case
that had anything to do with race." Reid Interview, supra note 182. Gladys Robinson, the Education
Chair of the North Carolina NAACP, reported that the plaintiff attorneys never contacted her
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I suppose we could have done things to focus more on the special problems of
African Americans, and that could have had either positive or negative effects.
Anyhow, the issue that was at the forefront of our concerns was the problems of
schools and students in low-wealth districts. We hoped that addressing those
problems would benefit children of all races. 189
The strategy seems to have succeeded thus far. If the state supreme court
upholds the pre-kindergarten ruling from Hoke County, plaintiffs' attorneys
will have won a remedy that benefits at-risk students, who are
disproportionately students of color, 19  without suffering the adverse
consequences that often result from legal challenges that are framed as
addressing minority student issues.
The lack of hyper-segregated school districts in North Carolina provides
another possible reason for the neutral racial dynamic in the Leandro litigation.
In comparison, the plaintiff school districts in New Jersey's Abbott v. Burke' 91
litigation, which the public viewed negatively as a race case, 92 are more
strikingly identifiable as minority districts than the majority-minority districts
in Leandro. The thirty Abbott districts currently have a combined student
enrollment that is 86.5% students of color and 13.5% white students,
193
whereas the combined student population of the Leandro plaintiff and plaintiff-
intervenor counties is 51.3% students of color and 48.7% white students.
1 94
This thirty-five point gap might explain why the North Carolina litigation
escaped public classification as a "race case" while the New Jersey litigation
did not. The difference in racial composition is in turn traceable to the size and
boundaries of the school districts in each state. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg
School District has 106,153 students as a result of its atypically expansive
boundaries, which are coterminous with Mecklenburg county boundaries and
therefore include students from both the inner-city and surrounding suburban
organization. She speculated that the plaintiffs "may have been afraid of what the association with us
might have brought," since many in North Carolina view the NAACP as highly "political" and
"aggressive" in North Carolina. Robinson Interview, supra note 182. However, despite its lack of an
official role in the lawsuit, the North Carolina NAACP took a public stance on the litigation. See
Associated Press, NAACP Urges N.C. Not to Appeal School-Funding Ruling, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER,
Apr. 27, 2002, at B2.
189. Tiller Interview, supra note 71.
190. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., HIGH STANDARDS FOR ALL STUDENTS: A REPORT FROM THE
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF TITLE I ON PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES SINCE THE 1994
REAUTHORIZATION 6 (2001) ("Minority students participate [in Title I services for at-risk children] at
rates higher than their proportion of the student population.").
191. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott I), 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d
359 (N.J. 1990); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott III), 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV),
693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998); Abbott v. Burke
(Abbott VI), 748 A.2d 82 (N.J. 2000); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott VII), 751 A.2d 1032 (N.J. 2000); Abbott
v. Burke (Abbott VII), 790 A.2d 842 (N.J. 2002).
192. See Ryan, supra note 173, at 432-33.
193. See Educ. Law Ctr., Abbott District Profiles, at http://www.edlawcenter.org/
ELCPublic/AbbottvBurke/AbbottProfile.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
194. See N.C. DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, supra note 9, at 19-21 thl. 12.
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communities.' 95 In contrast, the Newark School District has 42,241 students, all
of whom reside in the city itself.196  Since minority children reside
disproportionately within central cities and white children reside
disproportionately in outer suburbs, 197 the narrower drawing of school district
boundaries helps explain why the Newark schools have 91.4% students of color
while Charlotte schools have a comparatively small 55.3%. 198 Since the
phenomenon of larger school districts with coterminous county boundaries
exists throughout the South,1 99 school finance plaintiffs in these states may face
smaller chances than their Northern counterparts of encountering racialized
public reactions to their efforts to equalize educational opportunities.20
C. Leandro, Vertical Equity, and Litigation Classes Defined by At-Risk Status
Over the past decade, the emphasis of the school finance litigation
movement has evolved from educational equity to educational adequacy.
20 1
Some education law scholars, however, have called for the movement to evolve
even further toward vertical equity,202 the concept that differently situated
children should be treated differently in order to achieve defined levels of
outputs. 2° 3 In other words, students with greater needs should be given greater
resources. While normatively appealing, few courts have proven willing to find
a constitutional mandate for extra resources for the students with the greatest
needs.204 Before the Hoke County ruling, the New Jersey Supreme Court
195. Id.
196. Educ. Law Ctr., supra note 193.
197. ERICA FRANKENBERG, CHUNGME LEE & GARY ORFIELD, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD
UNIV., A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? 5 (2003),
available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf.
198. See Educ. Law Ctr., supra note 193; N.C. DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, supra note 9, at 20
tbl. 12.
199. "The largest countywide school districts that contain both city and suburban schools are
mostly concentrated in Southern States." FRANKENBERG, LEE & ORFIELD, supra note 197.
200. However, the South's current trend of school re-segregation may quickly erase this advantage
and cause the public to view cases like Leandro as "race cases." See John C. Boger, Education's Perfect
Storm? Racial Resegregation, High Stakes Testing, and School Resource Inequities: The Case of North
Carolina, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1375, 1460 (2003) ("[T]he struggles within southern state legislatures ... are
real, and because of the growing racial segregation, pose the danger of becoming increasingly
racialized-especially insofar as increasing segregation of North Carolina schools ... begin[s] to frame
the need for additional resources in racial terms.").
201. "Although the equity paradigm has dominated school finance litigation in the past, there has
been a movement in scholarship-and the beginnings of a shift in the litigation-toward an alternative
model, one that focuses not on equality but on the substantive right of every student to an adequate
education." McUsic, supra note 136, at 115-16.
202. See Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy As Vertical Equity, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
493, 517 (1995) ("Children who have greater educational needs should receive greater educational
services."); see also, Martha Minow, School Finance: Does Money Matter? 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395,
400 (1991) ("[E]quality and fairness do not mean treating every student identically.").
203. Berne and Stiefel, supra note 6.
204. Several courts have noted that vertical equity is an appropriate policy choice for state
legislatures, though not an appropriate constitutional mandate. See, e.g., Roosevelt Elementary Sch.
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provided the lone exception. The New Jersey court has actually implemented a
vertical equity remedy, holding that the needs of students from poor districts
required the State to spend even more money than it spent on students from
wealthier districts in order to satisfy the state constitution.20 5 Indeed, the New
Jersey decision proved influential in the school finance movement's second
vertical equity victory, as Judge Manning cited the Abbott ruling in his ruling
on the constitutional right to pre-kindergarten for at-risk children.
20 6
In one important respect, the Hoke County vertical equity ruling surpasses
the Abbott ruling. New Jersey's litigation has not created vertical equity across
the entire state; instead, the remedy only applies to children in thirty plaintiff
districts. 207 At-risk children in more than 500 other New Jersey school districts
do not benefit from the Abbott rights. If a child who is poor or has limited
English proficiency happens to live in a New Jersey medium-income school
district that does not provide pre-kindergarten, that at-risk child has no
constitutional right under Abbott to receive the additional resources granted to
other at-risk students.208 In such circumstances, the Abbott ruling allows for a
mismatch between the constitutional wrong and the remedy. As noted earlier,
the U.S. Supreme Court raised this very concern in rejecting the plaintiffs'
claims in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodgriguez:
[T]hese [disadvantaged] groups stand to realize gains in terms of increased per-
pupil expenditures only if they reside in districts that presently spend at relatively
low levels, i.e., in those districts that would benefit from the redistribution of
existing resources. Yet, recent studies have indicated that the poorest families are
not invariably clustered in the most impecunious school districts.
20 9
Thirty years later, North Carolina's Hoke County ruling solved the mismatch
problem. If upheld by the state supreme court, the ruling will guarantee all at-
risk children in North Carolina the constitutional right to pre-kindergarten
regardless of where they live or the quality of the public schools they attend,
thereby shifting to a system based on academic need rather than geographic
location. In that sense, North Carolina's ruling sits at the forefront of school
finance litigation's fledgling movement toward vertical equity.
210
Dist. v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 816 (Ariz. 1994) ("We emphasize that a general and uniform school
system does not require perfect equality or identity. For example, a system that acknowledges special
needs would not run afoul of the uniformity clause."); see also Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby,
777 S.W.2d 391, 397-98 (Tex. 1989) (noting that the State may choose to recognize differences in costs
associated with providing an equalized educational opportunity to disadvantaged students).
205. See Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998) (finding pre-kindergarten services
and other remedial programs necessary to provide students in plaintiff districts with a constitutionally
adequate education).
206. Order of Feb. 9, 1999, supra note 75, at 6 (citing Abbott V, 710 A.2d at 462-64 (1998)).
207. Alexandra Greif, Politics, Practicalities, and Priorities: New Jersey's Experience
Implementing the Abbott V Mandate, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 615,626 n.85 (2004).
208. Some low-income rural districts have filed complaints seeking Abbott district designation. Id.
209. 411 U.S. at 56-57 (1973).
210. But see Greif, supra note 207, at 625-26 (describing a wide array of additional programs
targeted at students in Abbott districts). In North Carolina's Hoke County ruling, vertical equity for at-
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The North Carolina trial court arrived at vertical equity only by
dramatically departing from the initial goals of the litigants in the North
Carolina case. Judge Manning found that there are essentially two types of
children in North Carolina: those who are at-risk and those who are not.
21
Whereas the plaintiffs' original complaint envisioned an altogether different
dichotomy of North Carolina students: those who live in low-wealth districts
and those who do not.212 Indeed, Robert Leandro acknowledges that he would
not have qualified as an at-risk student,213 and therefore, would not have
qualified for the constitutional right to pre-kindergarten.
The question, then, for those school finance reform advocates who want to
promote vertical equity in education is whether defining a litigant class based
on geographic district lines or individual student needs will be more persuasive
21to courts and legislatures. 14 The North Carolina litigation provides one piece of
215
anecdotal evidence in favor of the latter option. In turn, this anecdote
warrants a more systematic evaluation of what litigators might gain or lose by
focusing their school finance cases on individual student need rather than
geography.
One advantage of focusing school finance lawsuits on at-risk children
involves aligning the interests of rural and urban communities. Despite early
tensions, the Leandro plaintiff parties successfully avoided the rural-urban
divisions that occurred in the school finance cases in two other Southern states.
In both Arkansas and Tennessee, urban districts intervened on the side of the
State in school funding lawsuits brought by poor rural districts."' In North
Carolina, the lawsuit's initial focus on spending inequities and equalization
risk children is limited to one school input, pre-kindergarten.
211. Hoke County Bd. ofEduc. v. State (Hoke County IV), No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 78 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2002) (on file with author).
212. The plaintiffs originally asserted that "the State system does classify students, based on where
they live." Brief for Plaintiff-Appellees at 16, Leandro v. State, 468 S.E.2d 543 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996)
(No. COA95-321) (brief filed June 19, 1995); cf Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellants' New Brief, supra note
50, at 21 ("The focus of the inquiry, moreover, should not be on funding disparities among school
districts, but on differences in opportunities available to individual students, regardless of where they
live and go to school.").
213. "I wasn't specifically an at-risk student based on my economic background and parental
background." Leandro Interview, supra note 44.
214. Two legal scholars have noted that school finance litigators in adequacy cases face the same
choice: "Adequacy is a child-based concept. Conceptually, the unit could be the individual child, but
litigators in state school finance cases have thus far used it as a district-level concept." Berne & Stiefel,
supra note 6, at 22.
215. For Judge Manning, the issue became quite simple: "Are there going to be more resources
applied for some children to learn than for other children to learn? And the answer to that is common
sense. Of course." Manning Interview, supra note 74.
216. Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist., 651 S.W.2d 90, 91 n.2 (Ark. 1983) (describing the intervention of
two urban school districts on the side of the defendant in litigation brought by eleven rural school
district plaintiffs); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter (Tennessee Small School Systems III), 91
S.W.3d 232, 234 n.4 (Tenn. 2002) (describing the intervention of nine urban school districts on the side
of the defendant in litigation brought by eight rural school district plaintiffs).
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formulas also threatened to pit the rural and urban districts against each
other.217 One Leandro observer noted that the urban districts' "argument about
the unconstitutionality of supplemental funds drove a wedge between the
unified efforts on the part of all schools in this state and really set a bad tone at
the beginning of the litigation." 218 However, the Leandro districts eventually
found common ground. Plaintiff-intervenors' attorney Audrey Anderson noted,
"It's relatively unusual for there to be in the same suit plaintiffs who are
representing both rural and urban districts. There was some of that tension in
our case, but we were able to put those differences aside and focus on the needs
of at-risk kids., 219 The plaintiff parties created this consensus only after the
North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' equity arguments and the
plaintiff-intervenors' challenge to the supplemental funding. 22 Indeed, some
legal scholars have cited the Leandro litigation as evidence that adequacy cases
are more likely than equity cases to allow urban and rural districts to unite
behind a shared strategy to improve education for all children.
221
After Judge Manning's trial court proceedings focused all of the plaintiff
parties squarely on the topic of at-risk children-whether in rural or urban
districts-the plaintiff parties began to make legal arguments in unison. In fact,
Judge Manning said that during the trial he saw no substantial difference in
their legal arguments:
They were never at odds. In fact, I sat here and reviewed one afternoon the
proposed findings of fact. I had them "red, green, and white" the proposed findings
of fact. If you disagree, you red line it. If you agree, you place a green line though
it. And white meant you thought it was irrelevant. And I only found two lines in
disagreement between the plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors. I can't remember
what they were; they were two little irrelevant facts in the middle of 180 pages.
They were lock step with each other.
222
This confirms attorney Anderson's observation that the plaintiff parties were
able to unite around the needs of at-risk students, 223 and raises the possibility
that adequacy litigation centered specifically on those students across an entire
state might be more conducive to urban-rural cooperation than adequacy
litigation based on geographic distinctions arising from school district lines.
217. Tiller Interview, supra note 71 ("We were disappointed by the challenge of the supplemental
funding. We thought that their argument was weak legally, as well as inequitable.").
218. Malhoit Interview, supra note 182.
219. Anderson Interview, supra note 51.
220. Tiller Interview, supra note 71 ("After our initial differences with the urban intervenors, we
managed to find a lot of common ground. And now our view of the issues is very similar.").
221. Minorini and Sugarman have written that the Leandro suit "illustrates the applicability of the
adequacy theory to both low-wealth rural districts, as well as high-wealth, high-need urban systems."
Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, Educational Adequacy and the Courts: The Promise and
Problems of Moving to a New Paradigm, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE 175, 198
(Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999).
222. Manning Interview, supra note 74.
223. Anderson Interview, supra note 51.
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Perhaps the most significant benefit of focusing litigation on at-risk
children derives from the increased likelihood of winning legislative approval
of the court-ordered remedy. Remedies that increase funds for only the poorest
schools benefit the constituents of a limited number of legislators. By contrast,
remedies focused on at-risk children across the entire state have wider
legislative appeal because virtually every school district-and consequently
every legislative district-has at least some poor, minority, or Limited-English-
Proficient students. Thus, legislators representing districts with average-
spending or even high-spending schools may be less likely to oppose the school
finance remedy since their constituents stand to gain at least some additional
state funds. These seemingly small political considerations should not be
underestimated, as many commentators have observed that legislative
recalcitrance has been the greatest roadblock to the school finance litigation
movement.
224
The long and ongoing political popularity of Title I in the U.S. Congress
demonstrates how state-level remedies focused on at-risk students might
benefit from increased legislative support. Title I dates to the Elementary and
Secondary Edttcation Act of 1965225 and provides funds to schools that have
high concentrations of children from low-income families in order to pay the
extra costs of educating disadvantaged students. In other words, Title I is the
federal government's attempt at vertical equity. The benefits of the program are
spread widely, as Title I funds reach 45,000 schools in 13,000 school districts
that serve more than 12.5 million children.226 One commentator for Education
Week has noted: "To maintain broad political support, money from Title I-the
largest federal program for K- 12 education-touches every state, nine out of 10
school districts, and six out of 10 public schools. Put another way, the money
reaches constituents for every member of Congress. ' 227 Similarly, a court-
ordered plan of pre-kindergarten or other remedial programs for at-risk children
would reach the constituents of every member of the state legislature. While
this does not guarantee universal support, it does increase the probability that
some swing legislators will vote in favor of proposals to implement the school
finance litigation remedy.
However, attorneys who focus their school finance lawsuits on at-risk
224. See Michael Heise, Choosing Equal Educational Opportunity: School Reform, Law, and
Public Policy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1122 (2001) ("Resistance to judicially mandated or initiated
school finance reform, both formal and informal, hinders many successful lawsuits that rely on
legislators and governors for implementation at the remedial stage."); Mitchell Interview, supra note 59
("The biggest problems the states have run into with these education decisions has been the vehement
reactions of their legislatures when the courts went in and told them how they had to budget.").
225. Pub. L. No.89-10,79 STAT. 27 (1965).
226. INDEP. REVIEW PANEL, IMPROVING THE ODDS: A REPORT ON TITLE I FROM THE INDEPENDENT
REVIEW PANEL 2 (2001).
227. Erik W. Robelen, Off Target?, EDUC. WK., Sept. 5, 2001, at 1.
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children also face some opportunity costs. Such lawsuits might forfeit the
chance to create systemwide or "whole state" improvements in public
schools. 228 A comparison of the Leandro litigation in North Carolina and the
Rose 229 litigation in Kentucky demonstrates this tradeoff. While the adequacy
rights enunciated in each case are quite similar,230 the two states have taken
drastically different approaches to defining a remedy. The Kentucky court
pointed to evidence that the entire public school system was inadequately
funded, noting that Kentucky ranked fortieth nationally in per pupil
spending. 23 1 Within a year of the decision, the legislature created a sweeping
and comprehensive remedy that added more than one billion dollars to the state
public school system.232 While there exists no guarantee that any other state
legislature would prove equally responsive to a systemwide remedial order,
plaintiffs that approach the courts with a more narrowly focused demand
cannot expect to receive a state-wide remedy.
The Kentucky court concluded that even children in the State's higher-
spending districts were not receiving an adequate education,233 and the Leandro
plaintiffs had reason to hope for a similar result. As Mike Ward, the North
Carolina Superintendent of Public Instruction, pointed out after Judge Manning
denied a court-ordered increase in statewide funding: "I don't want any of us to
be comfortable with the notion that there are enough dollars in the system-not
in a state where the average per pupil expenditure is $1,000 less than the
average for the nation. We need to make a bigger investment in our schools. '
234
According to one legal observer, the "biggest disappointment" of the litigation
was the narrowing of the focus to only some children "when this case was
brought because the system as a whole was under-funded., 235 John Doman of
the North Carolina Public School Forum also noted a mismatch between the
trial court's remedy and the school system's overall inadequacies:
We are under-performing up and down the ladder; it's not just at-risk kids that
aren't doing well here; it's also kids in the middle of the pack. I think the idea of
taking what little resources there are for kids at the top and giving it to kids at the
bottom just doesn't make any sense. 23 6
As these complaints demonstrate, focusing litigation on at-risk children may
228. McUsic, supra note 136, at 91 ("The whole state remedy is appropriate in circumstances
where virtually all the state's schools are inadequate and underfunded.").
229. Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
230. Indeed, the Leandro Court cited the Kentucky decision approvingly. Leandro v. State, 488
S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997).
231. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 197.
232. Kern Alexander, The Common School Ideal and the Limits of Legislative Authority: The
Kentucky Case, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 341, 343 (1991).
233. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 198.
234. David Rice, N.C. Ordered to Help Schools; Ruling: At-Risk Kids State Responsibility,
WINSTON-SALEM J., Apr. 5, 2002, at IA.
235. Hancock Interview, supra note 27.
236. Dornan Interview, supra note 34.
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come at the expense of a broader remedy that increases funding and improves
education for all children.
237
Another disadvantage to narrowing a school finance lawsuit's focus to at-
risk children involves school districts' willingness to provide financial support
for the litigation efforts. In the Leandro lawsuit, each of the plaintiff and
plaintiff-intervenor counties helped fund the litigation, gambling that their up-
front costs would lead to eventual increases in state funding.238 However, this
risk may have appeared less appealing to the low-wealth districts if they had
known from the start that the case would only provide a remedy for a subset of
their children rather than a large infusion of state funds. According to John
Doman of the Public School Forum: "Most of the educational community is not
thrilled with Judge Manning's ambivalence about whether money matters. I
think there are a number of [plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenor counties] that
have really been soul searching about whether they want to go the distance."
239
By focusing on at-risk children from the start, potential plaintiff districts will
face a best-case scenario that involves a smaller return for their money than the
best-case scenario of a Kentucky-style whole-state reform. While this calculus
may make some districts less enthusiastic about lending financial support to
litigation efforts, it will probably not deter all districts. Many potential plaintiff
districts will probably realize that Kentucky's billion-dollar remedy is singular
in the history of school finance litigation,240 and that a court-imposed remedy
focused on at-risk children could still lead to significant amounts of additional
state funding.
In summary, these pluses and minuses of school finance litigation focused
on at-risk children leave attorneys and their clients with a difficult choice. On
the one hand, narrowing the focus could make litigation more difficult if fewer
districts are willing to contribute to the up-front costs. Moreover, narrowly
focused litigation will not address the systemwide inadequacies in those states
that invest too little in public education across the entire state. On the other
hand, lawsuits focused on at-risk children allow for the successful cooperation
of districts that might otherwise be pitted against each other in both the
litigation and legislative politics of school funding. The North Carolina
plaintiffs were able to avoid the divisive rural versus urban and low-wealth
versus high-wealth conflicts that proved detrimental to school reform efforts in
other states. Most importantly, lawsuits focused on at-risk children promise an
increased probability of legislative enactment of a court's remedy and, as
237. As the named-plaintiff's mother has noted, "It started off, we wanted a school activity bus and
AP courses. Next thing I know, we're getting preschools." Todd Leskanic, Low-Wealth Schools Still
Waiting, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, Feb. 11, 2003, at B 1.
238. Hancock Interview, supra note 27.
239. Doman Interview, supra note 34.
240. Carr and Furham, supra note 173, at 156 ("Considering the contentious nature of school
finance politics, the Kentucky example appears somewhat miraculous.").
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evidenced by the federal experience with Title I, long-term political support to
keep funding the remedy long after the court system has stopped actively
monitoring the case. Since judicial orders only benefit children to the extent
that they are implemented by legislatures, this advantage cannot be
underestimated. Lastly, litigation focused on at-risk children might solve the
decades-old mismatch between constitutional wrong and remedy. In so doing,
the school finance reform movement would ensure that it does not neglect the
plight of some of society's most disadvantaged children.
D. Pre-Kindergarten: The Next Trend in School Finance Litigation Remedies?
Regardless of whether litigants choose to frame their cases around at-risk
status or geographical district lines, pre-kindergarten may soon play an
increasingly prominent role in all types of school finance litigation. First, as
pre-kindergarten education becomes more common across America's public
schools, school finance litigators are likely to raise questions about which
students are being excluded from this important educational experience.
Second, to the extent that courts are persuaded by social science research in
determining whether or not to grant certain remedies, pre-kindergarten
specifically may prove more compelling than additional dollars more generally.
Consequently, school finance attomeys may shift their litigation strategies to
benefit from the increased chances of courtroom success.
According to a 2000 national policy survey, a "major educational shift in
the past five years has been the move by many states to establish a pre-
kindergarten program for four-year-olds." 241 In 1995, Georgia became the first
state in the nation to create a universal pre-kindergarten program.242 More
recently, Florida voters overwhelmingly approved a 2002 constitutional
amendment stipulating that all four-year-olds must receive a free pre-
243kindergarten education by 2005. However, funding universal pre-
kindergarten remains difficult, especially in light of recent budget shortfalls
across the state.244 Nevertheless, Steven Barnett, the Director of the National
241. James Gallagher et al., Study of Education for Four Year Olds: State Initiatives, Nat'l Ctr. for
Early Dev. & Learning, available at http://www.fpg.unc.edu/-ncedl/Pages/projectSummary.cfm?
studyid= 14 (last visited Apr. 19, 2004); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., New Survey Takes
Roll on Prekindergarten in U.S. Public Elementary Schools (Mar. 31, 2003), available at
http://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2003/03/03312003.html (noting that public elementary schools
enrolled approximately 822,000 children in pre-kindergarten classes throughout the country during the
2000-01 academic year).
242. Diane Loupe, Pre-Kindergarten Program Expanded, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 6, 1995, at
1 A (quoting the Georgia governor, "Today we become the first state in the country, in fact the first state
in this nation's history, to offer pre-k for every 4-year-old who wants it.").
243. Lori Horvitz et al., Voters Approved Measures That Require Smaller Class Sizes and Free
Kindergarten for All 4- Year-Olds, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 6, 2002, at Al.
244. Leslie Postal, Pre-K's Fizzle Out Along With Money, ORLANDO SENTINEL, April 6, 2003, at
B 1 (describing how some districts are eliminating or scaling back pre-kindergarten programs despite a
constitutional requirement that the programs be fully implemented by 2005).
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Institute for Early Education Research, thinks the fledgling national trend
toward greater pre-kindergarten coverage might aid school finance litigators:
Education is expanding into pre-k. You're getting a trend of having near universal
coverage of preschool for kids at the top of the income spectrum. As preschool
becomes [the norm], I think that brings to the fore questions about who has been left
out of what is now considered a common experience. 
2 45
While Barnett's equity argument might carry strong political and moral weight
in all states, it will only benefit school finance litigators in states that have
246found a constitutional right to equal educational opportunities. In states such
as North Carolina, where courts have rejected equity but accepted adequacy
theories, litigants would have to argue that pre-kindergarten programs are
necessary to help students achieve the state's constitutional floor of educational
attainment.
The relative strength of social science research in support of pre-
kindergarten, as compared to research regarding other school inputs, also lends
support to this potential new trend in school finance remedies. For decades,
school finance reform efforts have been hampered by the lack of a clear
consensus on whether additional money raises educational achievement. As
early as the Rodriguez litigation in the early 1970s, courts have had ample
research on which to rely in denying plaintiffs their requests for additional
funds.2 4 7 The North Carolina Supreme Court followed this trend, quoting
several social science and legal sources in Leandro for the proposition that
additional money would not necessarily remedy constitutional violations.
248
Similarly, the Hoke County rulings relied heavily on a few examples of low-
wealth schools that have produced proficient test results despite low funds
24 9
and the trial testimony of Dr. Eric Hanushek. 250 Although some studies do
245. Telephone Interview with Dr. Steven Barnett, Director, National Institute for Early Education
Research, Rutgers University (May 14, 2003) [hereinafter Barnett Interview].
246. See, e.g., Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997) (holding that the school finance system
violated the equal protection and education provisions of the Vermont Constitution, which guarantee
substantial equality of educational opportunity).
247. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23 (1973) (describing the
question of whether money matters as "unsettled and disputed," and ruling against the plaintiffs' claim);
Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1027 (Colo. 1982) (rejecting plaintiffs' claims and
ruling that the "difference in quality between two schools cannot be determined simplistically by
examining only the differences in per-pupil expenditures"); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40,
61 (R.I. 1995) (ruling against plaintiffs' claims and noting that "the school district at issue in [Missouri
v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995)] illustrates that money alone may never be sufficient to bring about
'leamer outcomes' in all students").
248. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 260 (N.C. 1997).
249. The trial court highlighted five low-wealth schools in which achievement on North Carolina's
EOG tests was "outstanding" and student populations were over fifty percent African American, Native
American, and/or Hispanic, as well as more than seventy percent eligible for free or reduced-price lunch.
Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County III), No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 85-88 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Mar. 26, 2001) (on file with author).
250. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County I), No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 73-74 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000) (on file with author).
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show a positive correlation between increased expenditures and student
achievement, 251 when presented with conflicting studies, courts have not often
favored the research supporting additional funds. 2
In contrast to the studies on school spending, research findings from a
spectrum of academics, 253 think tanks, 254 government agencies, 255 and even one
of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks256 have consistently shown strong benefits
resulting from pre-kindergarten education. Helen Ladd, a Duke University
education economist who served as a consultant for the Leandro plaintiffs,
compared the relative weights of the social science research:
Increasingly education research is being evaluated on the extent to which it is based
on the gold standard approach of an experiment with random assignment of
students. The fact that much of the highly cited research on pre-k education is based
on such experiments may account for the perception that research is stronger on the
value of pre-k than of k-12 education where experiments have been fewer and
harder to do.
2 5 7
251. See, e.g., Ronald F. Ferguson, Paying for Public Education: New Evidence on How and Why
Money Matters, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 465, 488 (1991).
252. But see Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107 app. at 140 (Ala. 1993) (reprinting Ala.
Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, No. CV-90-883-R (Ala. Cir. Ct. Apr. 1, 1993)) ("[T]he Court finds
that Dr. Ferguson's analysis of the relationship between school spending and student achievement... is
superior in terms of data and research design to that of Dr. Hanushek and, thus, it accepts the view that
there is a positive correlation between spending on education and student performance ....").
253. See, e.g., W. Steven Barnett, Long Term Effects of Early Childhood Programs on Cognitive
and School Outcomes, FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Winter 1995, at 25 (reviewing thirty-six studies of model
demonstration projects and large-scale public programs to examine their long-term effects on children
from low-income families, and finding that high-quality programs can produce large short-term benefits
on intelligence quotient and sizable long-term effects on school achievement, grade retention, placement
in special education, and social adjustment); see also JANET CURRIE, EARLY CHILDHOOD INTERVENTION
PROGRAMS: WHAT DO WE KNOw? (2002), available at http://www.jcpr.org/wpfiles/currie-early_
childhood.pdf (recognizing that not all studies have produced consistent evidence in favor of early
intervention, but demonstrating that the methodologically superior studies tend to find larger and more
significant long-term effects, and showing that the effects of intervention are generally larger for more
disadvantaged students); ARTHUR J. REYNOLDS ET AL., AGE 21 COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE TITLE I
CHICAGO CHILD-PARENT CENTERS (Inst. for Research on Poverty, Discussion Paper No. 1245-02,
2002) (demonstrating that academic benefits from preschool education can yield long-term economic
benefits-in terms of savings for the welfare and criminal justice systems-that far outweigh the costs).
254. See, e.g., Educ. Comm'n of the States, Pre-Kindergarten: Selected Research & Readings,
at http://www.ecs.org/html/ssueSection.asp?issueid=184&s=Selected+Research+%26+Readings (last
visited Apr. 19, 2004); Nat'l Ctr. for Early Dev. and Learning, Research, at http://www.fpg.unc.edu/-
NCEDL/PAGES/research.cfm (last visited Apr. 19, 2004); Nat'l Inst. for Early Educ. Research,
Resources, at http://www.nieer.org/resources (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).
255. SHARON L. RAMEY ET AL., HEAD START CHILDREN'S ENTRY INTO PUBLIC SCHOOL: A
REPORT ON THE NATIONAL HEAD START/PUBLIC EARLY CHILDHOOD TRANSITION
DEMONSTRATION (2000), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/core/pubs-reports/hs/transition-study/
trans study.html (contesting the view that the benefits of Head Start "fade out," and contending instead
that a vast majority of Head Start children achieve at the national average after two or three years in
public schools).
256. Art Rolnick & Rob Grunewald, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Early Childhood
Development: Economic Development with a High Public Return, FED. GAZETTE, Mar. 2003, available
at http://minneapolisfed.org/pubs/fedgaz/03-03/earlychild.cfm (finding that well-focused investments in
early childhood development yield high public and private returns).
257. E-mail from Helen Ladd, Professor of Public Policy Studies and Economics, Duke University,
to Tico Almeida (May 5, 2003, 15:57:08 EST) (on file with author).
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Dr. Barnett concurred:
I think the research evidence for pre-school is stronger. One of the key differences
is that most of the research on does money matter was econometric research on
natural variation in spending [as opposed to research with a control group]. These
natural variation studies almost always violate a host of the assumptions under
which you can estimate a valid production function. So that evidence was inherently
weak. Whereas with pre-school research, we have had many more randomized
trials.
258
However, the value of the pre-kindergarten social science research is not
without limits. As Dr. Ladd notes, "With respect to pre-school education, the
findings imply that high quality, expensive pre-school programs of the type that
have been evaluated can be beneficial, but the question arises whether that is
the type that will be implemented on a relatively large scale."
259
Despite this limitation, the North Carolina litigation demonstrates how pre-
kindergarten findings can convince judges and even defendants in school
finance cases. Judge Manning supported his order enunciating the
constitutional right of at-risk children to pre-kindergarten education with
favorable research conducted by the University of North Carolina's Child
Development Institute. 26  Chief Justice Mitchell speculated that the social
science might prove persuasive to the North Carolina Supreme Court when it
reviews the Hoke County ruling:
It's a question of evidence. If all the evidence indicates, and I think it pretty well
does, that the early years of education are when the human brain is most absorbent,
then I think the trial court is entirely justified in making a finding to that effect, and
then take the next step and say this is an area where it is appropriate for you to
begin the remedy of the problem.
261
Moreover, in a notable omission, the State's brief to the North Carolina
Supreme Court appealing the Hoke County ruling does not cite a single study
questioning the benefits of pre-kindergarten education to at-risk children.262 To
the contrary, the State admits in its brief that "[q]uality pre-kindergarten
education can affect academic achievement., 263 If the appeal had been over a
court order for mandatory funding increases, the State's brief most likely would
have included many citations of studies finding that money does not increase
academic achievement. Either because the State could not find convincing
studies questioning the benefits of pre-kindergarten or because citing such
findings would have been politically untenable, the State chose not to argue
against the efficacy of pre-kindergarten.
258. Barnett Interview, supra 245.
259. Ladd, supra note 257.
260. Order of Feb. 9, 1999, supra note 75, at 6 (citing FRANK PORTER GRAHAM CTR., THE EFFECTS
OF SMART START CHILD CARE ON KINDERGARTEN ENTRY SKILLS 8-9 (1998)).
261. Mitchell Interview, supra note 59.
262. Brief for Defendant-Appellants, supra note 16. Instead, the State asked that the pre-
kindergarten ruling be overruled on separation of powers grounds. Id. at 42.
263. Id.
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However, no amount of supportive social science research will guarantee
success for future school finance litigants who focus on pre-kindergarten. In
fact, just months after the final ruling in North Carolina's Hoke County case,
the Arkansas Supreme Court overturned a trial court decision that found a
constitutional right to pre-kindergarten. 264 According to the Arkansas plaintiff-
intervenors, "there was no evidence presented at trial to rebut the testimony of
educators and experts that early-childhood education is a necessary component
of an education system which reasonably expects to enable significant numbers
of students to perform at grade level. 265 Accepting this argument, the Arkansas
trial court found that "in order to provide our children with an adequate
education as required by the Constitution.. ., the State must forthwith provide
programs for those children of pre-school age that will allow them to compete
academically with their peers. 266
However, the Arkansas Supreme Court overruled the trial court, holding
that the plain language of the state's education clause did not support a
constitutional mandate of pre-kindergarten programs and that the matter was "a
public-policy issue for the General Assembly to explore and resolve. ' 267 Thus,
the weight of the evidence regarding the efficacy of pre-kindergarten will not
always tip the scales on the constitutional question. Indeed, the State of North
Carolina's appeal of the Hoke County pre-kindergarten ruling is based on
arguments similar to the separation of powers reasoning that persuaded the
Arkansas Supreme Court to overturn the trial court decision in that state. 268
269Some observers fear that the Hoke County ruling will face the same fate.
Nevertheless, some litigators and education experts predict a coming trend
of pre-kindergarten as a remedy in school finance litigation. As attorney
Audrey Anderson, who represented the plaintiff-intervenors in Leandro, noted:
The social science evidence in support of quality pre-kindergarten programs is
particularly strong, and in addition, educators tend to think it works. If you have
conversations with educators across the country, that's one of the first things they
will say schools need. And it also makes compelling testimony for the judge. When
you have kindergarten teachers on the stand who testify that kids come to their
classes who have never held a book or never used a pencil in their entire lives, it's
264. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 500-01 (2002) (affirming the trial
court's decision that the state school funding system was unconstitutional, but overruling the trial court's
decision about pre-kindergarten).
265. Id. at 501.
266. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
267. Id.
268. See Brief for Defendant-Appellants, supra note 16, at 42 ("Quality pre-kindergarten education
can affect academic achievement, but the decision to provide pre-kindergarten programs as opposed to
other effective educational programs is clearly a nonjusticiable political question reserved to the
legislature."). Indeed, the State of North Carolina cites the recent Arkansas Supreme Court decision in
making its separation of powers argument. Id. at 45.
269. Malhoit Interview, supra note 182 ("Arkansas recently ruled that pre-school was not required




very easy for a judge to understand the importance of pre-kindergarten. 270
Professor Barnett, who presented his findings about the benefits of pre-
kindergarten programs to a national conference of school finance attorneys in
271the Spring of 2003, commented, "I did get the sense from some litigators that
they were not aware of all the literature on pre-k, and once they were aware,
they were more interested in including pre-k in their litigation. ' 272 If more
plaintiffs bring lawsuits for pre-kindergarten, it is perhaps only a matter of time
before more courts follow the lead of New Jersey and North Carolina in finding
a constitutional right to pre-kindergarten education.
IV. CONCLUSION: ASSESSING THE RESULTS OF LEANDRO V. STATE
With a decision still pending before the North Carolina Supreme Court, it
remains difficult to assess what school finance litigation will ultimately mean
for the children of the state. Nevertheless, this note offers some preliminary
reflections of the outcomes of the Leandro and Hoke County rulings. In terms
of political momentum for legislative proposals targeting at-risk children,
equity and adequacy of public school funding, and innovative expansion of
constitutional rights, Leandro has brought potentially positive, but still
uncertain, results.
A. Political Support for Proposals Targeting At-Risk Children
The Hoke County ruling has created political support for legislative
proposals targeting North Carolina's most disadvantaged children. Specifically,
the court decisions have benefited the More at Four program, Democratic
Governor Easley's plan to incrementally provide North Carolina's at-risk four-
273year-olds with pre-kindergarten. During the summer 2002, the Governor sent
what one newspaper called a "sternly worded letter" to all 170 members of the
General Assembly, arguing that the school-funding lawsuit had reached a
"crisis point" and urging lawmakers to act immediately to include more pre-
kindergarten funds in the State's budget.274 The Governor's pressure proved
270. Anderson Interview, supra note 51.
271. See Advocacy Ctr. for Children's Educ. Success with Standards, ACCESS Conference: Early
Childhood Education Experts Provide Stunning Evidence, at http://www.accessednetwork.org/
earlychildhoodpanel_03.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
272. Barnett Interview, supra note 245.
273. It may strike some readers as odd that a governor who aggressively advocates legislation
expanding pre-kindergarten for at-risk children also supports the appeal of the Hoke County ruling. The
author can think of two possible explanations: first, in a time of budgetary constraints the Governor may
prefer to slowly phase in the More at Four program so as not to jeopardize other spending priorities or
raise taxes; second, if pre-kindergarten is a constitutional mandate, then the Governor cannot take credit
for initiating its implementation. The Governor's lead education policy advisor was contacted for an
interview and chose not to comment while the appeal is pending.
274. Amy Gardner & Todd Silberman, Easley Demands Quick Action on Lottery, RALEIGH NEWS
& OBSERVER, July 23, 2002, at BI (Easley argued that "the court order is not going away. We need
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partially successful, as the state budget revision approved in September of 2002
expanded the pre-kindergarten program from 1,600 students the year before to
a new total of 7,600.275 Although thousands of North Carolina's at-risk children
still do not the opportunity to participate in More at Four, the Hoke County
ruling nevertheless proved helpful to pre-kindergarten advocates. According to
a member of the North Carolina General Assembly Education Committee,
"One of the justifications the legislature has used to fund More at Four during a
time of severe budgetary constraints is that it is court-ordered. '276 If upheld, the
Hoke County ruling might create sufficient political pressure to persuade
legislators to finally provide pre-kindergarten classes for all the state's at-risk
children.
Recent changes in federal education laws reinforce the Leandro trial court's
emphasis on the test results of at-risk children, and might create even more
momentum for targeting greater resources toward at-risk students. The federal
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA) 277 requires states to assess every
third through eighth grade student's progress toward state education standards
via standardized tests, and schools must make "adequate yearly progress"
(AYP) toward meeting their state's own standards.278 The new federal law also
requires schools to disaggregate their test data, thus revealing the performance
of various subgroups of students-such as students grouped by race and
ethnicity, disability, limited English proficiency, or economic disadvantage.
279
Unless each subgroup meets its yearly targets, a school can be deemed "in need
of improvement" even if the overall academic performance of a particular
school as a whole meets or exceeds annual goals.
280
The NCLBA and Judge Manning's ruling are both premised on the belief
that all or virtually all children can meet state standards. 281 Together, the
immediate revenue to implement More at Four ... ").
275. Kathleen K. Manzo, Quality Counts 2003: State Policy Updates, EDUC. WK., Jan. 9, 2003, at
156.
276. Ross Interview, supra note 180; see also Mitchell Interview, supra note 59 ("And the
legislature, just like legislatures did in the civil rights era, they can say 'the devil made me do it... the
court ordered me to do it.' It gives them perfect political cover.").
277. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 STAT. 1425.
278. U.S. Dep't of Educ., The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (Apr. 7, 2002), available at
http://www.nclb.gov/nclb/overview/intro/execsumm.pdf
279. U.S. Dep't of Educ., Stronger Accountability: The Facts About Measuring Progress, at
http://www.nclb.gov/nclb/accountability/ayp/testing.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
280. U.S. Dep't of Educ., The Facts About State Improvement Lists, at http://www.nclb.gov/nclb/
accountability/state/improvementlists.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
281. The "adequate-yearly-progress" goals of the NCLB are targeted to have students in every sub-
group meeting state standards within twelve years. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Paige Outlines
Adequate Yearly Progress Provisions (July 24, 2002), available at http://www.nclb.gov/media/
news/072402.html. Similarly, Judge Manning supported his ruling about Level III with the testimony of
a state education expert that "every school in North Carolina is capable of having 90 percent of its
students score at proficient levels on [state] tests." Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County I),
No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 119 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000) (on file with author).
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federal law and state constitutional ruling may sound an alarm bell about the
performance of at-risk children in North Carolina public schools. Plaintiff
Intervenors' attorney Anderson noted that, "The North Carolina ABCs had not
been disaggregating the data by income. The NCLB requires that states
disaggregate by race and by income, so I expect that you're going to be able to
show that it's these kids who are not making the standard., 282 In September
2003, the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction released the first set
of NCLBA results, and a majority of the state's public schools had failed to
283meet AYP. Since a large number of otherwise adequate schools failed the
standard because of the performance of some subgroups,284 some observers
*believe the NCLBA results could help reinforce Judge Manning's findings
about at-risk children and build political pressure to fully implement the pre-
285kindergarten remedy. With both a federal law and a state constitutional
mandate focusing attention on at-risk children, North Carolina policymakers
may be forced to devote more attention-and perhaps more resources-toward
the poor and minority students who currently receive the most meager
educational opportunities.
B. Equity and Adequacy in North Carolina School Funding
The Leandro litigation has produced mixed results in terms of equalizing
public school funding across the state, the plaintiff attorneys' primary concern
at the start of the litigation. The threat of litigation prompted the General
Assembly to create the Low-Wealth Supplemental Fund in 1991, and since then
the legislature has appropriated a total of $595 million in additional funds for
low-wealth schools. 286 In the ten lowest-spending counties, including Hoke
County, this supplemental funding accounted for an additional $425 per student
287during the 2001-02 school year. However, the General Assembly has never
fully financed the Low-Wealth Fund and, consequently, the most recent study
by the North Carolina Public School Forum shows that the current gap between
the state's highest-spending and lowest-spending counties is $1,437 per
282. Anderson Interview, supra note 51.
283. Press Release, N.C. Dep't of Pub. Instruction, ABCs Investment Pays Off (Sept. 10, 2003),
available at http://www.dpi.state.nc.us/abcresults/results_03/press-release_print.html (reporting that
only 46.9% of schools made AYP).
284. Id. (reporting that the state's schools combined met 90.5% of the total AYP targets, but
because so many schools had a small number of sub-groups that did not meet targets, only 46.9% of
schools made AYP).
285. Doman Interview, supra note 34 ("It could easily strengthen Judge Manning's argument about
at-risk students. Especially since it will show that at-risk students are not doing much better in wealthy
districts than in poor ones."); Malhoit Interview, supra note 182 ("That would certainly give leverage to
proponents of the ruling and proponents of the remedy.").
286. PUB. SCH. FORUM OF N.C., 2002 NORTH CAROLINA LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY 3
(2002), available at www.ncforum.org/doclib/publications/collateral/lsf/FinanceO2.pdf
287. Id. at 4.
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student, or $37,362 per twenty-six student classroom. 28 Moreover, this
spending gap has widened by 45.3% since the North Carolina Supreme Court's
1997 Leandro ruling that the state constitution guarantees no right to equal
educational resources.
289
Though public school funding in North Carolina remains inequitable, the
State's overall commitment to education funding has increased. Since the
litigation began in 1994, State funding for the public schools has increased by
40%.290 During the course of the litigation, the gap between the average teacher
salary in North Carolina and the nation as a whole has been cut in half.29'
Moreover, Hoke County seems to have benefited disproportionately from the
State's increase in funding. While the county's student enrollment increased
10% between the 1993-94 and 1998-99 school years, the State's contribution to
Hoke schools has grown by more than fifty percent for that same period.292
Perhaps these trends should be expected with successful adequacy litigation.
When the judiciary accepts adequacy arguments but rejects equity arguments,
high-wealth districts will continue to widen the gap by spending their own
funds on their own schools. However, at the same time, overall state funding
will increase and perhaps disproportionately benefit low-wealth districts, or at
least the low-wealth districts that served as plaintiffs.
Thus, with increasing inequities, but higher spending overall, the Leandro
litigation's effect on North Carolina education expenditures has been mixed.
However, final judgment is premature. As one member of the Education
Committee in the General Assembly has noted, "Nothing of significance is
expected to happen with respect to funding issues until after the North Carolina
Supreme Court rules for the second time."
293
C. Future Strategy for State Constitutional Innovation
Our nation's public schools too often relegate immigrant, minority, and
poor children to the classrooms with the fewest resources. Our schools provide
the least opportunities to the at-risk students who need the most help in meeting
their potential. For decades, school finance attorneys have worked to address
these inequities, and in a fair number of cases they have won state
constitutional victories on behalf of public school students. The Leandro
288. Id. at 1.
289. Id.
290. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke County I), No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 53 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000) (on file with author). However, the late-1990s was a period of expansive
budgetary surplus in North Carolina and in many other states. Therefore, the State's expanding
education expenditures cannot necessarily be attributed to the school finance litigation.
291. Id.at53-54.
292. Id.
293. Ross Interview, supra note 180.
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litigators have achieved perhaps the most innovative result in the realm of state
constitutional rights. In North Carolina, the constitutional right to pre-
kindergarten currently exists for all at-risk children throughout the entire state,
though not for middle-income and wealthy children in the same state. This
legal development is peculiar, yet progressive. It does not prevent the State
from making the policy choice of offering universal pre-kindergarten for all
students, but it does constitutionally require the State to address the special
needs of at-risk children. Along with the New Jersey ruling, the North Carolina
case may mark the commencement of a new stage in school finance reform.
Having once argued for equal resources, and later for adequate resources,
school finance litigators might now do well to argue for greater resources for
the students with the greatest needs. Such a commitment to "vertical equity"
would ensure that the school finance reform movement does not inadvertently
neglect "the students most clearly deserving of special protection." 294 By
choosing a strategy that focuses lawsuits specifically on the education rights of
at-risk students across entire states, school finance attorneys can better serve
the movement's original goal of creating equal educational opportunities.
294. Clune, supra note 3, at 730.

